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International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research
ISSN Online 2229-5518
ISSN Print: 2229-5518 9    
Website: http://www.ijser.org
scirp IJSER >> Volume 3,Issue 9,September 2012
The Importance of Firm Ownership on CEO Compensation: An Empirical Study on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Companies
Full Text(PDF, )  PP.57‐68  
Author(s)
Nulla, Yusuf Mohammed, D.Phil. & Ph.D. Student, MSc, MBA, B.Comm.
KEYWORDS
— CEO Compensation, Accounting Performance, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, Owner-Controlled CEO Compensation, Management-Controlled CEO Compensation, and NYSE Compensation.
ABSTRACT
This important study in Executive Compensation topic investigated the importance of Firm Ownership on the CEO Compensation system in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies. This research had compared the CEO Compensation System of the Owner-Managed and the Management-Controlled companies from 2005 to 20R0. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between the CEO Cash Compensation, the Firm Size, the Accounting Firm Performance, and the Corporate Governance, among the Owner-Managed and the Management-Controlled companies?. It was found that, there was a relationship between the CEO Salary, the CEO Bonus, the Total Compensation, the Firm Size, the Accounting Firm Performance, and the Corporate Governance, among the Owner-Managed and the Management-Controlled companies.
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