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International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research
ISSN Online 2229-5518
ISSN Print: 2229-5518 7    
Website: http://www.ijser.org
scirp IJSER >> Volume 3,Issue 7,July 2012
The Accounting Relationship between CEO Cash Compensation and Firm Size in TSX/S&P Companies
Full Text(PDF, )  PP.345-350  
Author(s)
Nulla, Yusuf Mohammed, D.Phil. Ph.D. Student, MSc, MBA, B.Comm
KEYWORDS
Canadian Executive Compensation, Firm Size, Total Sales, Total Employees, CEO Salary, CEO Bonus, and Toronto Stock Exchange Compensation
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the relationship between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Cash Compensation and the Firm Size in the TSX/S&P index companies from the period 2005 to the period 20R0. The totaled of the one hundred and twenty companies were selected through the stratified sampling method from the TSX/S&P index. The total sampling population was divided into three groups: the "Small", the "Medium", and the "Large". The research question for this study was - is there a relationship between the CEO Cash Compensation and the Firm Size?. To answer this question, the sixteen statistical models were created and accordingly sixteen attestations were performed. Overall, all the attestations results were found to have the relationship between the CEO Cash Compensation and the Firm Size. The correlations among the sub-variables of the CEO Cash Compensation - the Salary and the Bonus, and the sub-variables of the Firm Size - The Total Sales and the Total Number of Employees, were found to be ranged from the weak negative to the strong positive ratios.
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