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International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research
ISSN Online 2229-5518
ISSN Print: 2229-5518 10    
Website: http://www.ijser.org
scirp IJSER >> Volume 2, Issue 10, October 2011 Edition
Analysis of Denial of Service Attack
Full Text(PDF, 3000)  PP.  
Rakesh Rathi, Udai Nag
Proxy Network, Denial of Service, Penetration, Defenses
Proxy network-based defense has recently emerged to address an open research challenge. protecting Internet service applications from Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Such schemes use a proxy network as a mediator for a hidden application to prevent direct attacks on the application's physical infrastructure, while maintaining communication between users and the application. The proxy network provides a distributed front-end to disperse DoS attack traffic, thereby shielding the application. However, the basic feasibility and fundamental properties of such schemes remain unclear, posing critical challenges for their use. This Paper addresses these challenges by exploring proxy networks. Ability to resist important attacks: penetration, proxy depletion, and DoS attacks. We develop a generic analytic framework for proxy network-based systems, and use it to analyze proxy networks. resilience to penetration and proxy depletion attacks, characterizing how attacks, defenses, proxy network structure, and correlation in host vulnerabilities affect feasibility. Furthermore, using online simulation, we quantify the resistance to DoS attacks at an unprecedented scale and realism, by running real application, proxy network, and attack programs in a simulated network with a size comparable to tier-1 ISP networks. We show that proxy network-based DoS defense can effectively resist these attacks, and protect applications successfully. Specific results are the following. First, proactive defenses, such as proxy migration, are required for penetration resistance . proxy networks can be effectively impenetrable with proxy migration, but will be penetrated easily without proactive defenses. Second, correlation in host vulnerabilities makes proxy networks vulnerable to penetration. By exploiting host diversity and intelligent proxy network construction, effective resistance can be achieved. Third, topology is crucial for resisting proxy depletion attacks: when a topology's eigenvalue is smaller than the speed ratio between defense and attack, all compromised proxies will always be recovered; when a topology's Palladian spectrum is larger than this ratio, compromised proxies will linger, making the proxy network unrecoverable. Last, proxy networks provide effective and scalable DoS defense. They can resist large-scale DoS attacks, while preserving performance for the majority (>90%) of users. Furthermore, increasing the proxy network size linearly improves the level of resistance to DoS attacks.
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