Turkey’s Road to the European Union Membership
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Abstract—The issue and debate of Turkey’s accession in the European Union family is not something new and unknown. It is definitely one of the most discussed and controversial topics related to European Politics. The base of the doubts whether Turkey should be or not a member of EU, begins from the fact that the country, in the territorial aspect belongs more to Asia rather to Europe. Another one may be counted the final eradication of sultan power and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in October 1923. Still, the country continues being out of the European Family, and the reasons are being discussed. Is it the fact the Turkey’s accession would make changes in the religious issue of the EU? Or the fact that most powerful countries members of EU do not agree on accepting Turkey in the Union? What does EU loses if they do not accept Turkey? Is there a potential risk that Turkish authorities may lose their patience and turn towards another world powerful country – Russia, and find another Union in Asia? On the other hand, what would Turkey lose? They feel enough strong in the economical aspect and give the right to themselves to not fear anymore from the refusal of European Union, or in other words, see it not as a “must” for getting the famous membership. These are some general points and questions about what the paper includes and emphasizes on.

KEYWORDS – Turkey, European Union, accession, integration

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea behind very integration whether on regional or worldwide basis cooperation between states which enhances the security and stability among them. There are many examples of such integrations that helped securing long term peace and prosperity both in political and economical plan. The example of the European Union is often pointed out as an undertaking that maintains peace among its member states. From the perspective of the past experiences that countries that agreed to enter a certain modality of integration would benefit a lot in increasing cooperation among its members in many areas. The fragility of the Balkans is one of the main objectives of the European Union agenda. The turbulent history of the region implies more concern about the preservation of democracy, peace, and stability. The development of the region requires a good political stability and reconciliation between countries with their neighbors. The political stability and good governance are extremely important for the future of the region as a whole. Turkey as a country that links Europe with Asia through the Bosfor, does its effort in order to become a European Union member one day. The tentative of Turkey for the membership in the biggest union of the oldest continent has started two decades ago. There have been given so many terms and duties for Turkey to fulfill in order to get the title of the country a candidate of the European Union. The involvement of the country in all major Euro-Atlantic and European organizations: Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization of the North-Atlantic Treaty, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) transformed since January 1995 in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other similar organizations have given hope to Turkish authorities that the accession in the Union won’t be so hard. However, things will lag from the very start of this initiative. One of the EU’s greatest missions and challenges concerning external relations is the integration of the Balkan countries into the Euro-Atlantic structures, because these countries face many challenges: building democratic institutions; easing social tensions of ethnic ground; restoration of functioning market economy which can stand competition against developed economies (Orosz, A, 2010). Maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region, however, is not the exclusive issue of these countries. There is a mutual interest of EU member states and the Western Balkans to implement reforms and to form a framework for long-term stability which can counteract these negative trends. As an incentive, the EU offered a European perspective for these countries, which proved to be an essential part of the long-term, democratic state-building process. (Orosz, A, 2010).

After two decades of trying, the Turkish policy changes, led by the Prime Minister of the country Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who makes the most of the impossible things to become possible, the rise of economy, the low rate of unemployment, and some other requirements by the Union. There are written the data in
more details of the main events, negotiations, refusals, and such similar important things, in order the reader to see where all this starts, what obstacles appear during the way, the reactions of Turkey towards the requirements, the fulfillment of the obligations, and doing much more than that, still not being accepted.

There are not given the correct answers on the question “Why Turkey is still not a EU member”, because we are not the ones who have the answers, but, there are mentioned some of the possible reasons that are given and said all over the world by world politicians and analysts.

Turks usually tend to identify their country as Euro-Asian, but many geographers and politicians out of Turkey count it as European, respectively as a Balkan country. There are some experts who deny Balkan or European identity of Turkey, arguing that with its history, its affiliation to Islam and the last place to the fact that a total of 780,576 square kilometers territory only 23,623 square kilometers - ie. less than 4% are on our peninsula, therefore - in Europe. Last one is pretty doubtful, with many serious arguments. Some of those arguments are these: First, the final eradication of sultan power and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in October 1923. Secondly, the revolution conducted by Kemal Ataturk in all or almost all spheres of public life; Third, the involvement of the country in all major Euro-Atlantic and European organizations: Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization of the North- Atlantic Treaty, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) transformed since January 1995 in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and others. However, there is still the thought that Turkey has nothing to do with West Balkan countries. In that case, the question “What is the reason that pushes the consideration of the problem (or problems) formulated in the title of the paragraph “Turkish politics” of European Union, respectively: “European Union and Turkey”? would be logical”. In the following pages we will try to offer an answer to this quite interesting question to show what is or what might be on their issues analyzed here (Bion, D, 2008).

There will be many difficulties and obstacles during the journey. There will be counted many things lacking in Turkish policy by the European Union member countries that will make it even harder every time. The differences between Turkey and the Community are very high, the minority rights, the inflation and low economy, the disputes with Greece and many other reasons will be listed in the refusal answer of Brussels sent to Ankara.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This paper concentrates on secondary sources of research regarding the accession of Turkey in the European Union. The readings chosen for this paper were sourced from leading authors in the field, as well textbooks and electronic academic sources. Therefore, in order to understand the determinants and the factors that are necessary for the adherence to the union, secondary information was collected, and the data will be compared and analyzed. Finally, the research conclusions will be submitted.

2.1 Research questions

The purpose of this research is to find an answer to the following research questions while choosing among the best strategies in order to gain a competitive advantage:

1. What are the factors for integration that Turkey needs to fulfill?
2. What does Turkey gain from its membership in the Union, and what does the Union gain from its enlargement?
3. Are there any other factors beside economical and political that prevent Turkey from becoming a member of the EU?

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1 Turkish politics of the European Union

As it was mentioned, after the World War II, Turkey succeeds in becoming member of very important organizations for the interest of its national safety, in Balkans, Europe and the whole world. In order to fill in the list – the country needs the acceptance in the oldest Continent’s most important project so far – European Union. It was already stated that during the Cold War, the first place undisputed hegemon USA, clearly takes into consideration the strategic importance of Turkey in the world, begins quickly to work on the integration of Turkey in NATO. Even before the “birth” of the North-Atlantic alliance, in 1947 the country (together with Greece) turns into an object of the famous Truman Doctrine. Using the infamous "Communist danger hanging over Greece and Turkey," U.S. President Harry Truman calls the Senate to immediately help the Balkan Countries with an impressive amount for that period - $400 mill. This is the reason why the Truman Doctrine is counted as the beginning of the Cold War, by many researchers (Aleskandrov, E. 2001, p.152). In 1952, Turkey, again coming as a package with Greece, is accepted in the North Atlantic Treaty. Again, at the same time with Athens, Ankara submits
(July 1959) request for membership in EEC. Greece achieves to become a member of that community in 1981 by solving the problems and accomplishing its plans. It’s worth mentioning here that EEC for the first time breaks its rules by not accepting new members because of political reasons. The following exception will be made in 2007 during the EU accession of the Balkan countries - Bulgaria and Romania.

In contrast to the quick admission of Turkey in NATO, the European Integration starts to lag at the very start. For many bureaucrats and politicians of Western Europe the main reason is governmental coup carried out by Turkish Generals in May 1960, which in fact is only a cover or excuse the main reason, more than a real thing.

Research talks between Brussels and Ankara are stopped until April 1962. The following negotiations for specification of relations between EEC and Turkey are staggered until September 1963, when Association agreement between Republic of Turkey and European Economic Community is signed, known as the Agreement of Ankara. It came into force in January 1964. The accession agreement includes three stages: 1 Preparatory- that goes on for five years and allows eventual corrections in accordance with the terms provided in temporary protocol. 2-Transient- with the maximum length of twelve years, when the idea of Customs Union between the Community and Turkey should be done and for convergence of economic policy of Ankara with the one of Brussels. 3. True (decisive) on the basis of functioning of the Costumes Union and assumed strengthening of the coordination of parties in the field of economy (Bijon. D, 1970, p 14-15).

It is not explicitly stated in the document, but it is obvious that the party that needs to coordinate its activities in the economic sphere is Turkey not EEC. Especially important for the proposed analyses here is article 28 from the pre-accessed sited agreement in Turkey is estimated as its undisputed foreign policy success. Just then, in March 1972 Turkish Generals organize second coup (as already stated the first in May 1960). In 1974 the Turkish Army, enters in Cyprus. The island is finally divided. Ankara openly, challenging and demonstratively tolerates the creation of its new (country)- Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognizes (only that), giving on that way its (contribution) to the establishment of an extremely dangerous phenomenon of tension in the Mediterranean, near the Balkan Peninsula. These violent acts along with the third military coup, in September 1980 reduced almost to zero the foreign achieved results by then. The admission of Greece in the

In the Greek-Turkish disputes that were brought by the two NATO countries on the brink of war, “Europeans” do not accept “neutral” position that is demonstrated by the North Atlantic Treaty and some extend the White House, so they categorically support Athens. Relations between Ankara and Athens are frozen and remain such for more than ten years. It brings strong interferences between the EC and the US and places Washington in a delicate situation, which is forced to choose between its two strategic partners Ankara and Brussels. In the mid 80's of the last century Turkey faces serious changes. In the political sphere, exaggerated and extremely dangerous ambitions of high military are tempered, and the tradition of organizing state revolutions and changes of chosen democratic governments is broken. The activity of the parliament and the political parties is restored. Serious reforms in the economy begin to appear, expressing primarily in its liberalization. As a result, obvious changes of the authority and strategic importance of the country are made, as well as favorable adjustments in Turkish foreign policy activity. Encouraged by these positive changes, in 1987 Turkey submits an official application for membership in the Community. The opinion of the European Commission lasts for two years and in the end it is still negative. The main motives of refusal are found in the bad state of Turkish economy, but there are experts who are inclined to think that the real reason is based again in the deep problems with Cyprus and in the continuations of the tensions between Ankara and Athens. In some other texts, some printed different comments appear and bring the necessity of question of this type:

1. Should the membership in the Community of an Islamic state with vast territory and population of European dimensions comparable to the population of some of the leading European countries such as Germany and France, should be allowed.
2. Won’t the membership of Turkey in the EEC cardinally change the character of the community?
3. Is there a potential risk of Ankara involving its internal and foreign political dilemmas in the EEC, destabilizing in this way not only the community, the entire continent, even the entire world?

Among the most eloquent documents from this period is the
passed resolution in June 1987 from the European parliament for the issue of genocide over Armenians, something which is extremely painful for the Turkish politicians. Turkey reacts with a counter accusation that its Western partners do not abide by the rules set by them and change them “during the game”. Similar scenario was done in 2011, when a similar document was adopted in France, which cost serious diplomatic tensions between Paris and Ankara.

The collapse of the “world socialist system” after November 1989 reinforces the pro-European sentiments in Turkey. Especially not worthy is the evolution of the left powers in the country. Their categorical conviction of the 70’s of the last century, that EEC is “just a tool of imperialism and near colonialism expression” makes some place for the opinion that the entrance of Turkey in the community may play the role of catalyst in the democratization of the country. Some activities of the European institutions however ruin theses illusions. For example the famous negative opinion of European Commission from 19th December 1989 after the Turkish candidacy, becomes very famous. In the document of the Commission there are defined two “axes” of criticism: economic (according to which Turkish economy is not developed enough, and the structural differences between it and the community is unacceptably high, inflation and unemployment are very high, etc) and political (mainly highlighted are the problems before democratisations, human rights and minority rights, disputes with a member of the community- Greece, etc.).

In order the refusal not to appear as discouraging, the European Commission provides advanced cooperation with Turkey on four basic points: Finalization of Customs Union Work; Revival and strengthen of the cooperation in the financial field; development of cooperation in the sphere of industry and technology; expansion and deepening of the political and cultural contacts.

Even the superficial view shows that in this proposal of EC there is nothing new. In practice the aims are repeated, which are agreed with a protocol of accession from 1970, and in the same time very clearly the differences and the contradictions between some countries in the community which are becoming deeper in relation with European future of Turkey, are reviled.

Although aware that this is a foreign policy failure, Ankara is forced to swallow the anger and declare that continuous to see EEC as a privileged economic partner (Bijon, D. 1970). The disappointment of the Europeans is very strong, because another rejection of Brussels to speed up pre-accessed procedures is considered a continuation of “discriminatory acts of the European structures” against Turkey in the southern extension of the community in 1981 (when Greece is accepted) and in 1986 (when Spain and Portugal are accepted), and Turkey, in both cases remains “of the boat”.

The last refusal matches after time with a series of events that shock the world and led to previously unimaginable transformations in the order of powers in Europe including the Balkans. Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 unlocked “chain reaction of change”. Turkey also faced a different geopolitical situation. On one hand, the political class was highly disturbed by the real possibility that the country may lose its privileges from almost half century, which made it a strategic ally of the west, especially of the US, in regions that would become extremely important – Balkans and the Middle East. It was obvious that EC is obliged to make serious reevaluation of its foreign policy priorities. “During the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of fifteen in Carcassonne (18-19 March 1985) the priority was directed towards the extension of Union towards the countries of central and eastern Europe (the former socialist countries) as well as Cyprus and Malta (Kostel, E. 1999, p. 17). On the other hand, exceptionally favorable opportunities were opened for Turkey, where partially the vacuum in some former republics of USSR could be filled in. Now it can be confidentially that Ankara and Brussels were surprised and unprepared for the challenges that showed up. It is true that the agreement for the Customs Union with European Union concluded in March 6th 1995, ratified by the European parliament on 13th of December 1995, and entered into force on 1st of January 1986, is a contribution in bringing Turkey closer to European economic structures and factor of implementation of the declared objective of the government- modernization and Europeanization of the Turkish economy. In accordance with the cited agreement Turkey receive economic aid worth 3.2 billion dollars 1995-2000. Together with the positive results from the implementation of the same treaty, Turkish economists emphasize many negative effects for the Turkish manufacturer, whose production can not stand the competition of western goods, accepted massively in the unprotected Turkish market (Chavdarova, M. 2008, p.361)

Asymmetrical model of integration imposed in Turkey by Brussels in transformed in a prerequisite for the occurrence of serious conflicts. Turkish authorities didn’t succeed in assessing the changing of Community priorities (Sevilay E. Kahraman, 2000, p.5). This conclusion applies particularly strongly to the cited agreement of the Customs Union, especially the way in which it is evaluated in Turkey. Criticisms of most Turkish anti globalists and anti Europeans are based upon this document.

Especially shocking for Ankara was the fact that in 1997 all candidate countries were offered pre-accessed strategies, and
Turkey was given only a “special program”. The Turkish government is advised to work much harder to meet the economic criteria. At the same time the government is warned that attitude of Brussels towards the country will depend on the radical change in the field of human rights including minority rights (especially the Kurdish minority). Again a strong emphasis is put on the Turkish-Greece disputes over the BALT of Aegean Sea and other problem known from before. Ankara is persistently asked to put pressure on Turkish Cypriots in supporting the Greek Cypriots in the table of negotiations on the accession of Cyprus in the European Union. The situation created can be accepted as a kind of turning point in the relations EU-Turkey, where the first symptoms of important change of the tactic of the Turkish government for obvious “hardening” of its positions, appear. Ankara returns its not less categorical ultimatum to the categorical ultimatum coming from Brussels. Turkish prime-minister Mesut Yilmaz said that his country interrupts the dialog with EU and accuses former German counselor Helmut Kohl trying to turn the EU to a “Christian Club”. The threats of official Ankara for speeding up the process of integration of Northern Cyprus to Turkey sound very sharp and harsh.

The reaction of the Turkish government seems overly emotive. It can be hardly accepted that the experienced diplomacy with old traditions will fall on uncontrollable emotions, especially when it comes to such an important problem. The explanation of the Turkish reaction should be found in another way and place. The political class is hit by different criteria that are being asked from Turkey, on one hand, and towards countries that much quickly and in easier way achieve to get the membership, on the other hand. Such examples are Sweden, Finland and Austria, whose candidacies are discussed exactly in this period, and their access is legalized on January 01, 1995.

The explanation according to which, unlike previous states of expansion, three new members have well-developed economies, they are politically stable and well acquainted with the policies and procedures of the EU "because of the" negotiating process is quite easier compared to previous " (Evtimova, M. V. 2006, p. 166-167). Relations between Ankara and Brussels continue to develop with ebb and flow. In December 1999 Turkey officially receives the status of candidate country from the European Council. One of the possible explanations in this fact might be the role of Turkey during the intervention of NATO in Kosovo in the same year. The verdict of the Council is still confirmed and formalized again in March 2001. Then the European Commission adopted a document entitled "Partnership for the accession of Turkey." Ankara responds to it with its "National Program for the Adoption of the achievements of the European Union." For a bit more than half a year (from March to October 2001) were adopted 34 amendments to the Constitution of the country covering some of the most important areas of it’s life and the beginning of 2002 brings into force the new Civil Code.

Regardless of these achievements, Turkey remains offended even after a year and a half later – in October 2002. At that time, the European commission proposes the acceptance of eight Southern European countries in 2004. The list includes Cyprus, Malta but not Turkey. Right after two months – December of the same year, in the meeting in Copenhagen, European Council decides to open the negotiations with Turkey for its membership until the end of 2004, but with reserves, the country to meet the political and constitutional requirements and criteria of the European Union (Evtimova, M. V. 2006). Especially painful is accepted the statement of Commissioner for Enlargement Guenter Verheugen during his visit in Turkey in February 2004, when he names the sets of reforms of Ankara as "inadequate from a European perspective."

Substantial talks for the terms of Turkey’s admission in EU start in 2005, but move with a speed that causes irritation between the Turkish authorities. “Our country has no patience for such a waste of time and postponing” declares in this context the main negotiator of Turkey with EU, Egemen Bagışh (www. mediapool.bg). The dissatisfaction is easily explained: for four years (2005-2009) Turkey opens only 11 chapters (out of 35). In 2006 Brussels even blocks eight fields of negotiations. | In this case it is hard to use the arguments “on duty” for the delay of Turkish Economy, because the Government of Recep Tayip Erdogan achieves a great progress in this particular area (Patrick, S. 2007, p. 23). In the ranking list of most powerful countries in the world in G-22, Turkey I ranked in the respect ed 17th place and it’s soon possible to enter in the first ten. It’s not less important to mention the double economic growth. As a result, Turkey today is accepted as economic, political and military power in two exclusively sensitive regions – Middle East and the Balkan Peninsula. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan enjoys an enviable international reputation, which is also listed as the fifth in the list of most influential people in the planet.

At the end of the first decade of XXI century earlier observed trend of change of tactic in Turkish accession negotiations is again confirmed, but supplemented and re-developed. “Strengthening” of Ankara’s policy towards EU continues but now using another set of arguments associated with the so-called diversification, especially after the Russian - Ukrainian "gas war" in early 2009. Turkey is included in the complex, risky and difficult geopolitical and predicted geo-economic game. In 2009, an agreement is signed between the governments of Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria to build the pipeline "Nabucco", supported by the EU and USA, which should broaden suppliers and routes to Europe. In this connection at least two facts should be marked:
1. The pipeline will connect the Turkish city Erzurum with the Austrian one Baumgart- en. We mention and emphasize this fact because Austria (together with Germany and France) is one the biggest opponents of Turkey’s accession in the EU.

2. The indicative declaration of the President of EC Jose Manuel Baroso in the ceremony of signing the intergov- ernmental agreement. He expresses that “this agreement” will open the doors of a new era between EU and Turkey.. “Nabuc- co” can strengthen the relation between our nations, adds the EC President (www. mediapool.bg). Almost at the same time, Ankara signs a similar document related to the “South Stream”, project that is preferred by Russia. In this context a strong interest is caused by a press-conference of the Minister of Turkish foreign affairs Ahmet Davotoglu in Brussels in 2009. In a press statement where Turkey was criticized for playing a dual game in the energetic projects in EU and Russia and in the later journal question: “What is your strategy towards the pipelines Nabucco and Southern Stream” the Turk- ish diplomat answers: The Cold War is over and we do not see the world in categorical alternatives. EU can’t choose whether to use Russian gas or no. Our basic aim is the Integration in the EU and what is good for the European energetic safety. But, we, same as EU have our own energetic needs.

"Nabucco" is such an important project for us, that leaves all the rest in the second place. It can’t be said that “Nabucco” fails because Turkey signed with Russia for the “southern stream”. There is no reason for which both can’t be accompl- ished.

Furthermore, the head of Turkish diplomacy continues to an- swer with no less ambiguity, but at the same time starting to use vocabulary that can hardly be accepted as diplomatic. "At the moment Turkey is a member of the Security Council, the G-20, an observer in the African Union and Arab League ... said Ahmet Davutoglu. If Europe ignores Turkey’s role, it would be sad for the unfortunate missed opportunity, but it will not be a problem for us (subtext apparently suggests that the problem could be "huge" for EU -M.N.B.). If Turkey joins the EU, it will be a global leading force ... ". Particularly enlightening in this respect is the answer to the question:" Do you know that too active foreign policy role is more disad- vantage than advantage for Turkey? It may irritate some large European countries that prefer to run European foreign policy and Turkey primarily to follow it? " The answer of Turkish Foreign Minister is as follows:" It depends on whether thinking like a Turk or European. If on one side the Turkish influence minds, it will be a test whether this party puts in the first place the national or European interests. If narrow national interests prevail, the EU will not be successful (Davutoglu, A. 2009). The Oddyssead of Turkey lasting around half century towards the “road to Europe”, on one hand, and the inconsis- tency of Brussels, on the other hand, give enough reasons to summarize that more or less the reliefe contours of factors and groups who support, and most likely will support it in the future the European Perspective of Turkey, are already drawn. In the place should be mentioned the role of the United States of America. The American administration, regardless of the country’s president name, has always supported the idea that Turkey’s place its in the EU, and it’s full and complete Euro- pean integration will bring benefits not only to Turkey, but to the whole Union. The real motives of White House and the State Department are not always expressed clearly and under- standable, and are always “packed” in a way that makes it even more complicated their decoding and reading, especially for those that are not dedicated to this issue. The mystery (If there can mystery be mentioned at all) is shown as transparent when we focus the interest towards the aims of foreign policy of US. For The White House and the State Department, Turkey is the most important strategic partner in the region, who can be opposed only by one country – Israel. It’s not a secret that, not fully matching, the interests of Washington and Ankara in the Caucasian- Caspian region are very close. It’s about the aspirations of the two countries to reign these territories, be- cause the one who reigns them, will reign complete Euro-Asia. It’s also known for a long time that the hegemony in Euro Asia is a prerequisite for the hegemony in the rest of the world. Among other things, it’s about areas that are very rich in oil- and in source of energy they leave you no other alternative. Geopolitical and geo-economic situation increases considera- bly after the “Arabian Spring” and the civil war in Syria. That is one of the most important reasons for the impressive Turk- ish activity related to the mentioned events. Except that, the advices that Turkey can play the role of the “Trojan Horse” of the US in the EU, should not be ignored.

In most of these points positions of the U.S. and Turkey do not differ much from the particular position of the European Union as a whole and some of the leading countries in it. Is per- haps clearest motives of Great Britain. They could be defined as the the role of special (privileged) U.S. ally, which the UK is aiming to play over many decades, especially after the col- lapse of the colonial system. If you want to get rid of unenvi- able fame of "political dwarf", the EU is obliged to find its space in the same region. Without the aid of Ankara, however it would be practically impossible, even less if there is resistance coming out of it, especially if Turkey gets overseas support. There are no reasons for the rejection of this support, in spite of some disagreements between Ankara and Washington. At the same time Turkey needs the EU no less than Union needs it. This position has already been expressed not only by politi- cal analysts and journalists, but by senior Turkish officials too. "We need Europe and they need us," in October 2011, declared Turkish Minister of Finance. He supports his statement with very convincing arguments: Turkey adapts its economic mod- el towards sustainable growth. Living standards of the popu- lation increased three times in 20 years, and the economy has
doubled. Turkey not only passed relatively easy in crisis, but also marked "almost supernatural growth." Therefore "If Europe wants to be a key global player, needs Turkey". The fully integration into European structures will provide Turkish diplomacy with more effective levers and mechanisms for foreign influence and foreign policy. In other words, the European "uniform" will be an additional ID code for more than two decades of continuous foreign policy offensive of Ankara.

There are also some risks. First, it is not only about a possible, but also a real risk of opposing of interests of USA, EU and Turkey - together or individually, on the interests of another strong and stronger strategic "player" with understandable ambitions for a worthy position in the commented region - Russia. Risks coming out of such confront, will be compensated with at least good cooperation between USA, EU and Turkey. That's how at least is thought in Washington, Brussels and Ankara.

Second, in the analyzed case it is not particularly complicated the identification of individual groups lobbying the interests of Turkish membership in the EU. And it's not just about money or even lots of money, it's about huge amount of money. The fight is more than the impressive number of Turkish users (according to some recent unofficial sources about 72 million people, which after ten years may be already 90 million). The first interest is of course in the interests of the military - industrial complexes of Europe and the U.S., awaiting orders to modernize the Turkish Army in the amount of more than $ 100 billion. Not to be left behind the section of the civilian (civil) production in Turkey (vehicle production, production of agricultural machinery and equipment, agricultural production and animal production, etc.). The Turkish experience proves once again that often borders between economics and politics can be vague and blurry. It was already stated that Germany for example is among the countries that most actively oppose Turkey's full membership in the EU, allowing most so-called "Privileged status", but it does not bother the solid German companies to enter without hesitation in the Turkish market and invest in it respectable amounts.

Although conditional, it can be argued that the debate "for" and "against" the European perspective of Turkey formed three main groups of countries. The first group consists of countries that are committed to continuing negotiations with Turkey without placing additional requirements, with accomplishment of the previously agreed terms. Influential countries in this group are the UK, Spain, Portugal, and towards them are gravitating the former Baltic republics of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), as well as most new EU members from Central Europe (Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary). The activities of the aforementioned countries are explained by the fact that this policy is actually policy of the White House, and they (the countries) are its implementers.

The second group includes countries that set certain preconditions. Most typical is the case of Greece, which suggests that is unlikely to allow the admission of Turkey into the EU, before solving already standing chronic Greece - Turkey's problems (especially Cyprus and the Aegean Sea belt). No serious reasons to assume that the position of Cyprus fundamentally will differ from the position of Greece.

The mood indicators of the third group are the two countries who are counted as the moving force of EU-Germany and France, supported by Austria. Anti-Turkish feelings at them are stronger especially after the withdrawal of the Left, i.e after the election of Nicola Sarkozy as President of France and Angela Merkel as counsel of Germany, it is logical to think that Berlin won't adjust it's policy of obstruction in relation to Turkey's membership in the EU. In the policy of Paris after these issues, there are no noticeable new signs of serious corrections even after the election of Francois Hollande as a president of France. Without risk of going towards new mistake, it can be counted that among the European bureaucracy there are certain interested groups that wouldn't hesitate to use the case with Turkey when analyzing and drawing European perspective of the Western Balkans. In this sense, the survey of "Turkey's case" should not be accepted as lost time.

It's obligatory to be taken into account the development of situation in Turkey itself, in short and medium-term perspective. It's now clear that after few unsuccessful decades in negotiations with the European Union, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has succeeded in offering to his nation acceptable alternative of European integration - the already stated quick development of the country. After the appearance of Ankara as undisputed hegemon in the region, the move towards the EU can move in the backseat. For now, there is no obvious interest of the Turkish Government for another important project - the Russian initiative for Euro-Asian union as an alternative of the European Union, but it will be hard to exclude visionary future corrections in that direction.

5. CONCLUSION

1. Over the centuries the European idea suffers serious evolution. The efforts of several empires of violent unification of different territories are conflicting utopian ideas of "Confederation of Christian Europe", "unification of European countries in a permanent international community" (UNIVERSITAS), "United States of Europe ", "European Union within UN. "World War II inflicted a severe blow on the very foundations of the ideas of European integration. The positive changes come almost at the same time with the end of the war. Impulses come again from one of the leading European countries - France. Most important news is that taking into account the less-perspective and previous attractive but chimeric project for immediate and rapid integration and the tactical "step by step" is now accepted. It is shown as profitable and sets the beginning of Real European Unity.

2. The practical implementation of the European idea - the European Union, also passes through various stages. The start is on the European Coal and Steel Community. Unsuccessful are the attempts to prove integration in the military sphere and common foreign policy and security. However European integration continues to grow and deepen. Several expansions are done, two of which are in Balkan. Negative change is com-
ing in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Premature admission of Bulgaria and Romania causes resistance from some of the previous states, who declared the termination of the pre-accession and accession procedures. By doing so, the perspective of the Western Balkan countries for EU membership is furthered. Crisis, the EU was found in, negatively impacts on Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Updated old and new contradictions arise: “Old Europe” against “New Europe”, “North against South,” rich countries against poor countries. The old continent is standing before the real danger from explosive disintegration of the euro-zone, and the European Union at the same time. For the first time the question of organizing a referendum on leaving the EU is set. Logically comes to fundamental discussion of the objectives of European integration.

3. The pre-accession processes of Turkey are going through ups and downs. In the beginning stage Ankara should have shown that accepts the conditions of EU. After the democratic changes of 1989, the geopolitical role of Turkey however arose significantly. When Ahmet Davutoğlu stepped on the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Davutoğlu doctrine was prepared and launched knows also as “neo-osmanism”. Not the Turkish authorities more often declare that the unacceptance of Turkey in the EU, will cause more damage to the Union, than to Turkey itself. There are also some insinuations done that Ankara might take more serious corrections in its foreign policy and look for another alternative of the membership in the EU.

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