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REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY. CHALLENGES IN THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (ECCAS)

By

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the Fomba's family especially Fomba B.T.B who through his financial and moral support led to the success of this research.

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CERTIFICATION

The thesis of **Botambu Collins (SM14P142)** entitled, **"Regional Integration and Regional Security. Challenges in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)"** submitted to the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Management Sciences of the University of Buea in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Master of Science (M.Sc.) Degree in Political Science, has been examined and approved by the examination panel composed of:

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ABSTRACT

The study set out to investigate the causes of security challenges in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The insecurity in the Central African Sub-region has caused many deaths and damages to the inhabitants of the sub-region. Although the initial focus was on regional economic cooperation and trade, growing crises and conflicts in the region led to security issues becoming an important element in regional agreements and activities. The study examines the dynamics of security challenges in the Central Africa sub-region. The methodology adopted in this research was mainly qualitative analyses. The study however founds out that poor governance, dictatorship, coup d'états, civil strife, poverty, trans-national crime, porous borders, mismanagement of natural resources as well as corruption which characterised the sub-region have been the main causes of insecurity in the ECCAS' sub-region. It also examines Central African peace and security architecture and outlines major peace and security challenges confronting the sub-region. It posits that without moving beyond the current form and level of intergovernmental cooperation, attaining the goal of sustainable regional security will continue to be a potent challenge for the region. Solutions discussed in this context include greater commitment by member states, adoption of non-militarized security, the need for regional leader and involvement of non-state actors in regional peace and security processes.

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ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean & Pacific
ADB	African Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN	Association of South East Asia Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CDS	Defence and Security Commission
CEMAC	Central African Economic & Monetary Community
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern & Southern of Africa
COPAX	Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
CRESMAC	Maritime Security Centre of Central Africa
CSID	Cours Superior Interarmées de Défense
EAC	East African Community
EACJ	East African Court of Justice
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECGLC	Economic community of the Great Lake countries
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western Africa States
EEAS	European Union External Action Service
EEML	Ecole d'Etat-Major de Libreville
EPA	Economic partnership Agreement

EU	European Union
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FDLR	Democratic Forces for The Liberation of Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FLEC	Front for The Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
FOMAC	Central African Multinational Force
FOMUC	Force Multinationale en Centrafrique
FPJC	Popular Front for Justice in Congo
FRC	Forces Republicaines Federalistes
FRPI	Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MARAC	Central African early-warning system
MICOPAX	Mission de consolidation de la paix en République Centrafrique
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RISP	Regional Integration Strategic paper
SACU	South African Custom Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPLA	Southern Peoples‟ Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The concept of regional integration is nothing new to Africa. Africa has been the forerunner of economic integration initiatives as far back as 1910 with the establishment of the South African Customs Union (SACU), the oldest customs union in the world. Today, Regional economic integration is a dominant feature of the international political economy since the second half of the 20th Century (Uzodike, 2009:18). Its historical provenance can be traced to Europe, especially in the creation and development of what is now the European Union (EU). Similar integration schemes have also been initiated in other parts of the world (Uzodike, 2009:21).

In Africa, regional cooperation and integration initiatives gained prominence in the 1960s even though dated back in 1910, aimed at facilitating economic development and cooperation among African states. In Africa, there are fourteen regional integration schemes referred to as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), but only eight are recognized by the African Union (Braude, 2008:157) The AU in order to prepare for a wider continental union had grouped the region into smaller units of eight Regional Economics Communities which includes ECCAS in Central Africa, ECOWAS in West Africa, EAC in East Africa, IGAD in the Horn of Africa, AMU in North Africa, SADC in South Africa, CEn-SAd, COMESA.

With respect to regional security, it has considerable resonance in Africa. It chimes with the aspiration of Africans to handle continental problems without external interference. However, the structural conditions that have favoured

the emergence of regionalism elsewhere in the world are generally lacking in Africa. Regionalism in Europe was built on the foundation of strong nation states, each comprising a government capable of protecting its borders, exercising control of its territory, enjoying a monopoly of the legitimate use of force and capable of providing security and community to all its citizens. This combination of the attributes of statehood is lacking in many African countries. State weakness has tended to reinforce the attachment of Africa's political leaders to juridical sovereignty and the fierce protection of statehood rather than encouraging effective forms of regionalism (Clapham 1996:41). The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 marked a shift towards consolidating African peace and security activities at the regional level (Godfrey 2008:112).

The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC), launched in May 2004, is the key decision-making body in the new architecture. Its guiding principles include respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, sanctity of boundaries and non-interference; these however exist alongside radically new interventionist principles incorporated in the AU's Constitutive Act. AU member states have authorised the PSC, whose membership is tilted towards Africa's larger and stronger states, to act on their behalf. The fifteen-member Council can authorise the deployment of peace-support missions, recommend intervention on behalf of the AU and approve the modalities for intervention to restore peace and security (African Union 2002: Article 4h & i).

The AU's peace and security architecture provides the broader institutional setting within which ECCAS and Africa's other regional organisations operate. The 'regional mechanisms' are formally recognised as part of this architecture and the PSC is required to harmonise its activities with them. In

practice the AU looks to the sub-regional organisations to lead on crisis management within their own regions (Adar, 2000:28). This has certainly been the case in central Africa, where the PSC has consistently endorsed all the initiatives emanating from ECCAS.

Central Africa Sub-region has two main Regional integration schemes which are the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and they are often presented as rather young organizations, they both spring from old roots that can, in a way, be traced back to the early post-colonial or even colonial period. The region of Central Africa (here considered to include Angola. Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé & Principe. While Rwanda is generally considered to be part of Central Africa, it has been left out as it is not a member of either of the key regional organizations) was in 2003, estimated to host 107 million inhabitants, equal to 12% of the continent's total population. About 70% of the population live in rural areas (African Capacity Building Foundation. 2008:256).

Central Africa is characterized by a diversity of climates and has vast natural riches. This includes mineral deposits (particularly in the Great Lakes region), including oil, as well as agricultural wealth. The hydro-electric potential of Central Africa is estimated to be so considerable that the sub-region could supply electricity to the whole of Africa. In short, the region has very good economic prospects. Despite the sub-region's vast mineral wealth, a contradiction amidst profound poverty has attracted strong external interest and engagement that has more often than not exacerbated conflict and deepened instability. Structural problems such as extreme social inequalities

and poor governance also continue to underpin instability in Central Africa. The civil wars and social strife that enveloped the region have also created conditions for the rapid spread of the pandemic. Pervasive cases of rape accelerated the spread of the disease amongst the population in Africa (Capacity Building Foundation. 2008, 259).

However, a few countries in Central Africa have had relative political stability, and have experienced a relatively prolonged period of economic growth and prosperity, such as Cameroon and Gabon. The former stands out because of its wealth in natural resources, especially oil, minerals and agriculture. The new Gulf of Guinea geopolitics, with Cameroon now having full control over Bakassi peninsula and the increasing interest in oil and gas exploitation, mean that Cameroon is acquiring new relevance in the zone.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Central Africa Sub-region with its pivotal and strategic position makes it a potentially preferred transit zone between regions of the continent. Central Africa Sub-region is also one of the most volatile regions on the continent where poor governance, armed conflicts and transnational crime contribute to the persistent insecurity of states and peoples. Among its ten member states, ECCAS includes three of the world's six most fragile states. Protracted armed conflicts and rebellions in the *Democratic Republic of the Congo* (DRC) and *The Central African Republic* (CAR) have contributed to the instability of the region with serious effects on its neighbours, many of which have been directly involved in the conflicts. *Chad,* which struggles with political instability and frequent threats of rebellions, has been facing the spill over of insecurity from all its neighbouring countries for years. More recently the Nigerian armed group Boko Haram has emerged as a threat in Central Africa

as well by destabilising northern *Cameroon*, a country already seriously affected by acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. *Burundi* is in a post-conflict phase facing persistent political tensions and violence, with repercussions for the stability of the neighbouring countries, including Rwanda, which has expressed an interest in re-joining ECCAS (Ingerstad & Lindell, 2015:14). There is a risk of social unrest, political instability and falling oil prices affecting oil-producing countries like *Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea* and *Gabon* in the years to come since these countries depend mostly on oil, with the two former still recovering from decades of civil war. Those states also suffer from acts of piracy, as well as the island state of *São Tomé and Príncipe* (Ingerstad & Lindell, 2015:16). Unfortunately, the Central Africa regional integration scheme has been steadily side-tracked from its main objectives through many factors such as civil conflicts, mismanagement of natural resources, lack of democracy and good governance, corruption (such as Cameroon which was ranked as the most corrupted country in 2007 by Transparency International) and interference from former colonial powers. (Meyer, 2008:12). There becomes the need to address the problem of insecurity in the Central Africa sub-region as the problem affects all ten member states of ECCAS. The Region is at risk not meeting up with the RISP of 2011 as well as the ECCAS vision 2025, which seeks to transform the region into a haven of peace, solidarity, balanced development and free movement of persons, goods and services, but despite numerous effort as well as huge natural resources and oil reserves, the sub-region is still under developed, it is a warzone rather than a haven for peace as envisaged by ECCAS vision 2025. The problem here remain the fact that insecurity has caused many damages the entire sub-region and this work seek to investigate the causes of these security challenges.

1.3 Research Questions

The research seeks to answer the following questions

1) What are the causes of insecurity in the ECCAS' region?
2) What are the measures adopted by ECCAS to address issues of security in the region?
3) To what extent does the absence of a regional hegemon affects Central Africa regional integration scheme?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study has the following as objectives.

1) To investigate the causes of insecurity in the ECCAS' region

2) To examine the measures adopted by ECCAS to address issues of security in the region.

3) To assess the extent to which the absence of a regional hegemon affects the progress of ECCAS.

1.5 Hypotheses

The research will be guided by the following hypotheses.

H1: The outbreak of conflicts in ECCAS member states poses insecurity to the entire sub-region.

H2: ECCAS has adopted series of defence strategies to deal with issues of peace and security in the region.

H3: The absence of a regional Hegemon (leader) has an adverse effect the success of ECCAS.

1.6 Justification for the Study

Central Africa is currently shrouded by socio-economic problems and seemingly little is being achieved though monies, analysis, and extensive efforts are being exerted on the sub-region. The ten member states of ECCAS in theory poses hundreds of billions of US dollars in natural resources and many avenues for sustainable macroeconomic success, however many goals set by the region and individual member states have fallen short. However, it is the above justification that has given significance of this work, in examining the problems of regional security in Central Africa, the study will serve as a guide for policy makers in ECCAS.

The study is also important because it brings out the relationship between ECCAS and others regional integration scheme in Africa.

Also the research is vital because it stresses on the conflict in Central Africa Republic and how ECCAS responded to the conflict.

1.7 Scope

This study examine ECCAS from its inception from 1983 till 2015 and it explore the events surrounding its creation and also examine several turning points in the organizations' history. 1983 is chosen because it is the date in which ECCAS was created and 2015 because many of the ECCAS states were facing security threats. The study also looks at the current status of ECCAS; special emphasis was laid on the crisis in Central Africa Republic because it is the first country in which ECCAS deployed a peace keeping mission.

1.8 Limitations

The study invariably suffered from a number of drawbacks, which affected the collection of data. They include the following;

First, it was very difficult for the researcher to establish contact with ECCAS officials, some of the officials were reluctant in responding to the researcher and many of them were very busy and to overcome this, the researcher exercises enough patient to get in touch with available officials.

Also because of the sensitive nature of the research, due to the fact it is a security issue which are highly prioritized matter, some security personnel were reluctant to release certain key information and to circumvent this, the researcher guaranteed them their confidentially and non-disclosure of identity and hence they cooperated. Due to the civil conflict in Central Africa Republic, some classified information could not be given to the researcher and other useful materials were damaged. The researcher made use of the materials from the website of ECCAS as well as journals and military personnel that were present in the scene.

Furthermore, the ECCAS officials present in Cameroon, their working language was French and to overcome this, the researcher had to use the services of a translator.

1.9 Methodology

The methodology adopted in this research is based on the analysis and critique of various sources including treaties, books, articles and reports on ECCAS. Nevertheless, the study is not exclusively a literature survey. Primary source of data was gotten through interviews of eminent experts in the African Union such as the representative of ECCAS at the AU and individuals and military

personnel that were involved in MICOPAX mission in CAR. The researcher randomly selected those to be interview and the main criteria for random selection was military personnel who were part of MICOPAX mission, researchers who visited the scene as well as members of Doctors Without who visited The CAR were also interviewed as well as members of Doctors Without borders who were serving as health personnel.

The sampling population consist of seven military personnel, two ECCAS representatives at the AU, one member of Doctors without Borders as well two researcher who visited the Bangui. The total number of those interviewed were 12 which their views were used to generate primary data.

1.10 Theoretical Framework

1.10.1 Neo-functionalism

This study made use of Neo-functionalist theory of integration as opined by Ernst Haas. Neo-functionalism is a modified version of the functionalist theory championed by David Mitrany in his book *A working peace System* (1943).

Functionalism, which originally aimed at explaining the increased cooperation in Europe after the end of World War II: the initial cooperation in technical and economic issues made necessary the creation of institutions, which progressively extended the number of political issue areas they covered through spill-over effects (Schulz et al. 2001).

Mitrany's work was based on the idea that the most effective way to pursue a situation of peace was to create ambits of cooperation among states, by transferring authority from the governments to common institutions. Such transfers were more likely to happen in the sphere of low politics – especially

economic issues – than in the one of high politics, like security and more power-related issues (Mattli, 1999). Functional theory is based on the hypothesis that cooperation is characterized by an autonomous trend of self-increase, by which every function that is attributed to a supranational level of government will generate more functions of that kind, and the authorities created for the management of some functions will expand their role over more tasks and responsibilities.

Ernst Haas is the main author of neo-functionalism who theorized the community method pioneered by Jean Monnet, however, its main contention is more suggestive than Mitranian functionalism. It argues that states should begin integration modestly in areas of low politics, and a high authority should be set up as a sponsor of further integration; the first steps will create functional pressures for integration of related sectors and the momentum would gradually entangle national economies and social interests; deepening economic integration will create the need for further institutionalization, making political integration and a long-term system of peace inevitable (Rosamond, 2000:52). According to neo-functionalists, the processes of integration will in the end induce a federal unity; therefore, federal functionalism is occasionally used as an alternate title for neo-functionalism (Rosamond, 2000:49).

“Spillover” is a way of describing the central dynamic of that process where successful integration in an area of lesser salience needs leads to a series of further integrative measures in linked areas so that the process becomes increasingly involved with issues of greater political importance. Integration would be led closer to sovereignty and to involvement with such high political questions as the defence policy and foreign policy (Taylor, 1983:9). As

integrated production and distributing networks grow in different areas, involved countries have more and more common interests, which contribute to further integration.

In this argument, areas of low politics refer to economic and social life (Mattli,1999b:23), such as coal and steel industry and agricultural policies. Because of the development of international trade and related technologies, countries set up trading relationships in those sectors. Since cooperation in those sectors does not influence the security and survival substantially, it is less controversial. On the contrary, areas of high politics refer to those concerning national defence and governmental structures, and are highly related to the security and survival of a nation state. Therefore, integration in those areas is controversial and highly sensitive. Realists believe that supranationalism in high politics will threat national security and harm national interest greatly; therefore, it is not possible. However, according to neo-functionalists, nation states' perception on national interest in high or low politics can change over time.

Besides functional spillover, there are another two kinds of spillovers. Cultivated spillover refers to the situation that the achievement of new policies is not because of functional pressure or package deals, but cultivated by leaders representing the international institutions (Cini, 2003:86). The upgrading of member states' common interests relies on the services of an institutionalized autonomous mediator (Mattli, 1999b:26). Political spillover is not necessarily about political integration, but refers to political linkage of package deals that can be very complex. The emphasis is on actors and their (often haphazard) interaction. The process emerges from a complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment

(Rosamond, 2000:55). Thus, the concepts of cultivated spillover and political spillover bring in new factors that shape the process of integration: the institutionalized autonomous mediator (ECCAS elites) and a complex web of interest groups.

Walter Mattli (1999) illustrated the neo-functionalist account further by bridging political science and economics. He analyzed the interaction between political leaders and market players, and thus explained how the interest groups rather than the government or nation state (as an independent and monolithic actor) could shape national interests and policy outcomes. He has also solved the problem about legitimacy by stressing the role of national leaders (rather than ECCAS elites). He specified two types of necessary conditions for successful integration. First, the potential for economic gains from market exchange within a region must be significant. When regional economies are complementary and of large sizes, the gains from important economies of scale will be considerable. When the gains are considerable, the market players have a strong incentive to organize interest groups to lobby for regional institutional arrangements. Second, there should be considerable payoff for political leaders so that they are willing to deepen integration. For example, they are willing to deepen integration if such a move is expected to improve their chances of retaining power. If these leaders value political autonomy and political power, they are unlikely to seek deep levels of integration as long as their economies are relatively prosperous. Economically successful leaders are unlikely to pursue deeper integration because they expect marginal benefit from integration.

Political leaders value relative independence and support from organized groups that are against integration. However, in times of economic difficulties,

the leaders are likely to pursue to enhance the overall efficiency of the economy (Mattli, 1999b:52). Economic difficulties thus become a condition of integration. Another supply condition is the presence of a benevolent leading country pursuing integration. Such a country serves as a focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations, and policies (Mattli, 1999b:101)

According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991), criticism on Neo-functionalism has been coming from two camps. Firstly, interdependence theorists agree with Neo-functionalists on the notion of a plurality of actors, but criticize the theory for lacking a global applicability (due to its focus on developed, pluralistic democracies) and seeing interdependence as a process towards a supranational institutional outcome. Instead, it sees interdependence as a condition for, but which does not necessarily imply, integration (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991:8). As Keohane and Nye (1987) state in their book *Power and Interdependence Revisited*, increased interdependence between states reduces chance of engaging into conflict, without implying increased integration. A second source of criticism initially comes from Stanley Hoffman, who developed a theory in the 1960's called 'Intergovernmentalism', which is essentially a realist perception of IR to the EU.

This theory is relevance to this study because members of Central African States enters into regional economic integration in areas of economic cooperation such as trade, agriculture cooperation, coal and steel (referred by Neo-functionalist as areas of low politics) for the aim of improving the lives of their citizens, due to the growing security crisis, they became "spillover" effect forcing the members to further integrate in areas of defence (areas of high politics) thus making the theory very suitable for this work.

1.11 Organization of Thesis

The thesis is organized in the following chapters;

Chapter one is introduction composed of, background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, aims and objectives of the study, hypotheses, justification for the study, scope and limitations of the study, methodology, theoretical framework and organization of the chapters.

Chapter two is made up of literature review, approaches to regionalism and regional security, the various theories of regional integration such as functionalism, intergovernmentalism, realism, liberalism, constructivism as well as federalism, overview of regional integration schemes in Africa and their response to peace and security as well as stages of regional economic integration.

While chapter three examines ECCAS from its creation and review their activities and current status.

Chapter four assesses the crisis in Central Africa Republic and examine the peace keeping missions deployed by ECCAS to consolidate peace (Mission de consolidation de la Paix en République centrafricaine) (MICOPAX). It also examines the causes of insecurity in ECCAS region as well as measures adopted by member states to address security challenges. It also outlined the need for regional leader (hegemon) as well as the problems affecting ECCAS.

Chapter five is based on summary of findings, recommendation for policy options and conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter examine the literature gap in which the study seeks to cover. It also examine the various approaches to regionalism and regional security. Various approaches to regional integration has been tilted to explain European Union integration process. No specific theory can be find which best explains regionalism in Africa. Some of these approaches include intergovernmentalism, functionalism, liberalism, realism and contructism.

There is a proliferation of literature on the issue of peace and security in Africa and among the sub-regional bodies in Africa, ECOWAS has extensively been discussed due to its real involvement in maintaining peace and security in West Africa (Paliwal ,2010). The same cannot be said of Central Africa.

Ela Ela (2001) addresses the issue of conflict in Central Africa. He focuses on the different mechanisms that can be used in order to prevent conflicts in the region. The author pays particular attention to the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa established by United Nations through the Resolution 46/37 B of 6 December 1991 adopted by General Assembly. However, ECCAS is not truly the main target of that study. Contrary to this work, this research will essentially focus on ECCAS and other sub-regional institutions will be used to add impetus to it.

Furthermore, Adebajo (2010) in his article entitled ‘The peacekeeping travail of the AU and the regional economic communities’ briefly discusses the mission of ECCAS in the field of peace and security (Adebajo, 2010:131). He addresses the drawbacks of this institution but he did not go deeper into the

reasons of ECCAS' ineffectiveness as will be the case with this study. Moreover, the author did not really address the therapy that ECCAS could follow in order to resolve the on-going conflicts that occur in the region.

Meyer (2011) in her write up 'Peace and security cooperation in central Africa: Developments, Challenges and Prospects' critically analyses the regional peace and security co-operation in Central Africa. Although she especially focuses on the peace and security missions carried out by CEMAC and ECCAS, she did not address the role that ECCAS plays in the Gulf of Guinea in maintaining peace and security. Moreover, her analysis only focuses on the crisis in The CAR and does not give attention to the situation in the DRC and Burundi. Contrary to that approach, this study is more focused on ECCAS which is the only institution with the required legal mandate in the Central Africa sub-region to deal with issues relating to peace and security. In addition, this study examines the Boko Haram crisis as well as the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over Bakassi Peninsula. It also explores the various international and regional instruments which constitute the legal foundation for ECCAS' peace and security mission.

2.1 Regionalism and regional security cooperation

Shinoda (2006) surmises that "regionalism is a key factor in many cases of peace building, since regional organizations play significant roles in implementing peace building activities. The basic logic of Regionalism as a peace building tool proceeds from the logic that, when a nation lacks the capacity to maintain peace by itself it naturally asks countries in the region to mobilise resources to assist. Many regional organisations serving this purpose have emerged the world over, these include; the Organisation for Security

Cooperation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and in Africa, the African Union and its sub regional organisations such as SADC and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as ECCAS. Regionalism is especially indispensable when an armed conflict arises with a regional political background, a case in point is the pattern of conflicts in Central Africa sub-region involving, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central Africa Republic (CAR). (Shinoda, 2006:17)

Breslin (2007) contended that the main contention of the New Regionalism is the relationship between regionalism and regionalization. Regionalism as the form refers to formalized regions with officially agreed membership and boundaries as a result of intergovernmental dialogues and treaties. Regionalization refers to the process by which societies and economies become integrated, particularly but not only in the economic sphere. The process of regionalization fills the region with substance such as economic interdependence, institutional ties, political trust, and cultural belonging, which promote the emergence of regionalism (Breslin, 2007:29).

Soderbaum (2009) provided a similar definition: regionalism represents a state-centered activity which usually leads to institution building and formal policies; regionalization refers to a society-centered process which leads to the concentration of activity of trade, peoples, ideas and even conflicts (Soderbaum, 2009:479) Increased attention by International Relations and Security Studies scholars to activities of states at the regional level is often traced back to English scholar Barry Buzan (Schouten, 2008:3). Movement in this direction arose out of the realization of the potential for finding solutions to problems from regional governance structures. A key proponent of

regionalism, Bjorn Hettne argues this cogently when he observes, "the regional is just 'right' because the nation state solution is 'obsolete' and the global is 'premature'.Hettne In the words of another key proponent of regionalism, Frederik Soderbaum

"…a world order based on regions rather nation states would represent a more stable and less hierarchical world order. The regions are better equipped to deal with regional characteristics, cultures and interests, and it would facilitate a better multilateralism: a regional multilateralis" (Schouten, 2008:4).

Soderbaum goes on to highlight the difference between the often confused concepts of regionalism, regionness and regionalization, in his words

…regionalism refers to the cognitive ideas and policy that are aimed at enhancing cooperation, integration or coordination within a regional space. It is usually associated with a regional programme, and often leads to institution-building. Regionalisation refers to the process of cooperation and integration creating a regional space, and to the 'outcome'. At its most basic it means a concentration of activity on the regional level, which may give rise to the formation of regions, regional networks and actors, or regional organizations (Soderbaum, 2012:6)

Van Nieuwkerk quotes Cawthra as identifying two types of sub regional security cooperation, these being collective security and collective defence. Collective security is defined as a situation where member states seek to prevent conflict between each other, while Collective defence is where states ally with each other and put in place arrangements for joint defence against external threat.

Cawthra (1997) suggests the former for third world countries as it can contribute to stability between and within states and create conditions for economic growth (Cawthra, 1997:12)

For Ngoma, sustainable peace, security and order in Africa can only be realised through the establishment of a security community. He quotes Karl Deutsch (a leading authority on the concept of security community) as defining it as a group of people, which has become "integrated". By integrated we mean the attainment within a territory, of a "sense of security" and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief…that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change". (Deutsch in Ngoma. 2003:6)

The UN Charter allows member states to form subordinate groupings in order to assist with the maintenance of peace and security. As stated in article 52 (1) of the UN Charter, 'nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and Principles of the United Nations" Article 53 of the charter states a requirement for the Security Council authorization before enforcement action can be taken by regional bodies. Security community comes into existence when a regional group develops institutions and practices that are strong and stable enough to assure stable expectations of peaceful change within its population in the long term. They are characterised by mutual interdependence between diverse political units; mutual

responsiveness of political units; and the renunciation of the use of force among political units (Archarya in Van nieuwkerk, 2001:4)

2.2 Approaches to regionalism and security

Regional integration in general describes the process of states entering into a regional agreement, in order to achieve specific, agreement-dependent goals through enhancing regional cooperation. In history there has not been another equal strong case of regional integration as the European Union (EU). So, many theories and approaches have been linked to the EU's integration process. Some of these approaches has been outlined as follows.

2.2.1 Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalist theorists reject the concept of 'spill-overs' seen in neo-functionalism as the main driver of the integration process and take factors into account that can limit the 'logic of integration', such as nationalism expressed by political leaders and sensitivity surrounding state sovereignty.

This theory has its foundation on between-government cooperation, and declares the member states as the main actors in integration process. It is those states' preferences and decisions that are primary and important and decisive when deciding on polities. The governments have a strong and autonomous position in this approach, and bargain intensively in order to get their interests followed in the European policies (Simon Hix in Daniele Caramani: 2011:51). Within the Intergovernmentalism, the national governments control the pace and nature of EU integration based on protecting and promoting their own national interests. When those national interests are of similar kind a closer integration is supported, but generally limited to some areas, as for example high sovereign sectors like national security and defense (Ian Bache: 2011:18).

Even though interest groups are able to perform influence on national government's policy making in low politics, like social and regional policies, they do not have the power to pressure governments to integrate, as those governments are independent decision-makers because of their legal sovereignty and political legitimacy. Further, national governments can with their decisions that are domestic driven, give directions to powerful interest groups to follow, instead of being pressured by those groups (Ian Bache: 2011:29)

2.2.2 Constructivism

Constructivist theories "focus on regional awareness and regional identity, on the shared sense of belonging to a particular regional community, and on what has been called 'cognitive regionalism'. They stress the extent to which regional cohesion depends on a sustained and durable sense of community based on mutual responsiveness, trust, and high levels of what might be called 'cognitive interdependence'" (Hurrel, 1995: 64).

An interesting example of constructivist approach in the study of regionalism is the one proposed by Neumann (2003), who studies the construction of interests "where they are formulated", through an understanding of the local social relations, ideas, identities and knowledge. In his region building approach, Neumann argues that in the formation of a region "similarities and dissimilarities are processed politically by [region-builders], and that these political actors are the ones to decide which similarities should henceforth be considered politically relevant, and which should not". In this optic, interests still matter, but "instead of postulating a given set of interests that actors are supposed to harbour before their social interaction with other collectives, the

region-building approach investigates interests where they are formulated, namely in discourse" (Neumann,2003:161)

Neumann's approach has definitely the merit to address a fundamental problem shared by both institutionalist and intergovernmentalist theories. In both cases, integration processes are explained on the basis of a convergence among interests, be they preconfigured for each state, as in the intergovernmentalist view, or built as a result of transnational networks of interdependence as in the case of liberal institutionalist theories. So the main distinction is about which interests prevail. None of the two, though, offers a satisfactory explanation of how interests are formulated. Neumann's answer is that the formulation of actors' interests is strongly based on the discourse underlying the construction of a region. Such discourse can have two interrelated dimensions: the 'inside-out', which consists of the narration of the external environment that prevails among the region-builders, and the outside-in, made up of the perceptions that external actors have of the region.

Neumann's approach can be improved and completed by a deeper questioning on the concept of interest, which offers not only a better understanding of the discourse underlying the genesis of a region, but also some insights that will be useful in the subsequent analyses of functionality and socialization.

The definition of interests, both in neorealist and neoliberal theories, is based on the main assumption of rational choice theory: "individuals' behaviours are rational". This means that if an agent chooses X rather than Y, this is because his interest is better served by X than by Y.

For the case of regional integration, both neo-functionalism and the new regionalism theories, limit themselves to explaining the process of creation and configuration of a regional union, pointing out the reasons for their

development and for the institutional structure that they can eventually adopt, the possible increases in their range of action and their potential for vertical and horizontal enlargement. Intergovernmental theories, on the other hand, are able to explain decisions a *posteriori* in terms of international power bargaining, including the decision to create supranational institutions, but an analysis of what political orientations are assumed by those institutions after their creation seems to be out of the intergovernmentalist research agenda.

What none of these regionalization theories can explain, however, is the political ideas to which, once created, institutions are inspired or what is defined in Hettne (2005) the political content of regionalization. To say it with Blyth's words, "structures do not come with an instruction sheet" (Blyth, 2002:251) but constructivist explain it all.

2.2.3 Liberalism

The academic approach to regional cooperation and integration has come mainly from the liberal field of International Relations. Early studies of liberalism, which were labelled as utopian idealism, argued that human beings are rational and are able to set up organizations for the benefit of all when they apply their reason to international relations(Santos,2009:4).Later, as interdependence increased between different (mostly Western democratic) countries due to increased travel, communication, trade and investment, liberalists argued that states prefer to satisfy economic interests through political cooperation in a positive sum game in which collective benefits are possible. Neoliberalism emerged in the 1980s in an attempt to explain these new developments, get rid of the flaws of utopianism and provide an answer to realist thinkers in a decade dominated by Cold War tensions. The theory emphasized economic interests, being national preferences, as the main driver

of cooperation. Economic interdependence became more important for wealth maximization as markets became more and more liberalized and barriers to trade were reduced. International economic order, neoliberalists argued, is then maintained by regimes based on the goal of free markets, free trade and minimal state intervention (Kim, 2011:413)

The notion of plurality to define the main actors in the integration process, leads Liberalists to not only focus on states but also other interest-groups, such as transnational societal elites. According to Neoliberal Institutionalists such as Robert Keohane, these interest-groups prefer an international institution to maximize wealth creation (Fjäder, 2012:74)

These institutions are able provide information and aid cooperation to build trust and reduce uncertainty between state governments. They can then influence states to choose future benefits over short-term gains by providing information opportunities to reduce transaction costs by enforcing agreements, thereby creating capabilities for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways and create collective gains. Rather than superimposing themselves on its member states, well-established institutions, Keohane (1998) argues, reinforce practices of reciprocity which provide governments with an incentive to stick with their commitments and make sure others do as well, making the behaviour of other states more predictable. (Keohane, 1998:83) In addition, Kim (2011) argues that undisputed regional leadership is another important factors to strengthen the role of institutions and deepen the process of integration. Integration, he states, does not only need demand from market actors to be successful, but also supply from political actors in the form of commitment and leadership within the institutional setting (Kim,2011:413).

2.2.4 Realist-inspired approach

Although Liberalism has been the dominant paradigm regarding regional integration, Realism is most commonly recognized as the main paradigm to explain intra-state relations within the African continent. (Weatherbee,2014:19-22) Realists are rather sceptical on the integration process in general, and particularly on its deepening process (Kim, 2011:411).By obtaining and utilizing national capabilities, realists argue, national elites are able to pursue geostrategic, national interests in an anarchic international environment. These national interests are static and defined by the nation's political elites (who have the authority to do so). Realist theorists' main arguments are centred on the idea that sovereign states, being the main actors in the process, are self-interested and mainly focused on the balance of power in a relative sum game. In contrast to liberalists, who argue inter-state decision are made on the basis of gaining collective benefits, realists such as Kenneth Waltz posit that states are concerned with the relative gains, in which some gain more than others(Weatherbee,2014:19-22). Furthermore, rather than on economic interests, realist arguments are centred on security interests, which are defined as state sovereignty, territorial integrity and survival and maintenance of the national political system.

When applied to regional integration, realists argue that individual state benefits are maximized through ensuring security and maintaining national values in a regional bloc that is able to withstand pressures from other powerful players in the competitive, international system. (Keohane, 1998:83) Within this regional bloc, there will be a struggle for power between supranational, authority-seeking institutions and individual member state governments to pursue their own interests. Politically, Realism has a very sceptical view towards deepening regional integration where states are pooling

their national sovereignty (and thus giving up a part of their own national sovereignty and ability to exercise power) Santos,2009:18), and sees integration merely as a means to satisfy national interests in which the power of the supranational institution is marginal and determined by national preferences.

2.2.5 Functionalism

Functionalism was developed primarily as a strategy to build peace. It proposes that common needs can unite people across state borders. Form is supposed to follow function, and nation state should be bypassed (Soderbaum, 2009:480)

Functionalists reject bold federalist plans for political integration. They were pragmatists, concentrating on the immediate needs of the survivors of World War Two. The concept of functionalism came from its idea that all actors' activities would be performed as functions of social systems based on the demands of individuals, society, and the whole international system. David Mitrany, the leading functionalist theorist in the postwar era, was interested not in the functional integration of European states,but in the creation of international organizations to fulfill certain specific needs, such as settling war refugees and regulating air traffic (Wood & Yesilada, 2002: 12). His work, *A Working Peace System*, appeared towards the end of World War Two. He was concerned to recommend strategies for achieving peace, and in the meantime avoided to be an idealist. His starting point is not the ideal form of the international system, but its essential functions that serve human needs (Rosamond, 2000:32). Each of such functions would require a certain amount of powers transferred from states to the international system. Mitrany considered that some requirements of human beings might best be served by

ignoring the conventions of national territory, which makes him distinctive from realists. Transnational institutions might be more efficient providers of welfare (Rosamond, 2000:33). However, it does not suggest any particular institutional goal but focus on the flexible means that could satisfy human needs. Functionalists assume that states serve for human needs without their own preferences.

After several functions are put into use, each is left to generate others gradually. In every case the appropriate authority is left to grow and develop out of actual performance. Sovereignty is thus transferred through the growing functions piece by piece. The divisions that cause conflict can be transcended gradually by seeking a web of international functional institutions managed by technical elites, and areas of functional cooperation are likely to be found in the areas of economic and social life (Mattli, 1999: 21-22).

The degree to which nation states transfer powers to international institutions is not only determined by human needs, but also by the sense of solidarity. Schuman insisted from the start that Europe had to be built by practical actions whose first result would be to create a *de facto* solidarity (Schuman, 1999:76). There are two types of solidarity. A sense of positive solidarity comes from various bonds and linkages among nation states and societies, such as geographical proximity, some social and historical bonds, intensifying economic interactions, common languages and religions, similar levels of economic development, similar political structures, and political amity among nation states. A sense of negative solidarity stems from common threats and challenges which nation states and societies are faced with.

One claim about the importance of functionalism is that it is an innovative approach to the study of international relations, especially in relation to

integration, and it laid the foundations for neofunctionalism. However, Mitrany objected to the association between neofunctionalism and the construction of new political communities (Rosamond, 2000, p. 39). His idea is Darwinian, insisting on flexible forms adapting to the changing needs, rather than a fixed ideal form of governance such as a new political community. While neofunctionalism is an approach of integration, functionalism is an approach of functions. Due to its flexible principle, functionalism does not give many predictions about the changes of international systems. The idea of its rational thinking suffers from the same criticism as realism.

Functionalism assumes that determination of needs is an objective exercise, but it overlooks that some self-interested actors, although disciplined by governments, may make decisions not according to human needs of the society, but to satisfy their perceived interests. The decision-making mechanism in national legislatures, democratic or autocratic, does not guarantee the best outcomes. In the context of a market economy, coordination in spheres, such as production, trade and distribution, is more complex because of their competitive nature (Rosamond, 2000:40). Some policies liberating the markets may be constructive for the country on the whole, but may be destructive to some interest groups. The perception of interests within a country may therefore be controversial. The outcome of policy-making is sometimes the result of the interactions between the private sectors and national governments The contention that form follows functions is criticized by realists. In practice, nation states and their preferences should override the needs of some domestic groups, according to realists. Some regional arrangements, especially those integrating defence and foreign policies, may meet the need for collective security according to functionalists. However, in

the anarchic system, fear and suspicion usually prevent nation states from cooperating in high politics and developing supranational measures.

2.2.6 Federalism

Federalism as a theory of regional integration is not as prominent as the theories of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are. Nevertheless, it can help to provide explanations for integration in general and international cooperation in Europe (and Africa) specifically. However, it must be made clear that a single theory of federalism can hardly be found, a characteristic that stems from the fact that many authors dealing with federalism have connected it to specific cases or political projects. Some aspects and assumptions of this theory can be found in several academic contributions to the debate nonetheless. It is uncontested, e.g., that the Italian Altiero Spinelli was one of the main actors in the aftermath of World War II to promote the idea of a politically united, federal European structure of government. But he was not the only one; in May 1948, the The Hague Congress (or Congress of Europe) took place, convening over 750 representatives from different political parties and organizations from Europe, and adopting several resolutions arguing for the creation of European institutions and a common market. This congress is seen as having given a boost to both the creation of the Council of Europe and the European Movement (Laursen, 2010:71). Concerning ideas of pushing for European integration, Loughlin claims that “the federalists”, Spinelli being one of them, “differed by their emphasis on the ideal of European unity as a political goal”, and continues: “the early years of European integration owed more to federalism than to regionalism” (Loughlin 1996:142). Other authors agree on the impact of federalism on European integration by pointing either at other

projects like the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) (Burgess,2009:19), or by explaining institutional set-up created in the Treaty of Rome through 'federal aspirations' by Community leaders (Koslowski 1999:26).

All of these works rather point at the important role that federalism has played in the creation of the European Union, but it is important to take a closer look at the assumptions it makes about how such integration processes come about. Concerning the definition of federalism, Burgess (2009) states that it "has been construed as a particular way of bringing together previously separate, autonomous, or independent territorial units to constitute a new form of union based upon principles that, broadly speaking, can be summarized in the dictum 'unity in diversity'" (Burgess,2009: 26). The notion of 'unity in diversity' is especially important when looking at international federal unions or organizations, as they differ from national ones like Switzerland, the USA, or Germany. Elazar adds to this definition and already points at a few factors that lead to the creation of a federation: "Federalism should be understood both in its narrower sense as intergovernmental relations and in its larger sense as the combination of self-rule and shared rule through constitutionalized power sharing in a noncentralized basis" (Elazar,1993: 190). Hence, the focus is put on the degrees to which each level of government has authority or sovereignty over certain fields of politics. Again, Burgess follows this idea in mentioning the importance of an 'anti-centralist' and 'anti-absolutist' system, bringing into play the aspect of subsidiarity, which is the concept of delegating decision-making power to the lowest possible level of government in order to allow for policies that are as close to the problem and the people as feasible, and as high up as necessary (Burgess,2009:36). The specific outcome of federal integration processes, however, is not a fixed concept. Weiler (2003)

agrees by stating that the EU was probably not created with the goal of being a federation, and refers to the constitutionalizing steps that have taken place after its creation, like the establishment of direct effect and supremacy of European law through the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Both a federation and a confederation can be thought of as goals of the integration process, which Forsyth (according to Burgess) has defined as follows: "a confederation is a union of *states* in a body politic in contrast to a federation that is a union of *individuals* in a body politic, suggesting the unity of one people or nation" (italics in original, Burgess 2009: 30). Taking into account the phrase 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' from the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, a confederation is probably what best describes the structure of the EU.

A lot has been published about factors that play a role in the integration process according to federalism, one of the main points being the desire for common security. If nation states or their people feel (or rather fear) they cannot provide security for themselves anymore, it might be a logical step to seek such security in the union with other states. An example for this can be seen in the project of the EDC, and the underlying idea behind creating European economic interdependency in order to prevent further war after the experiences of World War I and II. Vollaard describes the influence of William Riker on this aspect, also mentioning the role that a single 'federal bargain', or constituting event, plays in such a process (Vollaard,2008:5). According to McKay, there are always two conditions that need to be fulfilled before an international agreement can be signed. Firstly, there must be the intention of the participating parties to peacefully expand the territory that is being governed so that any military threat from outside can be challenged. Secondly, the will to exchange some political power to a higher level in exchange for the promise of security must be given (McKay 2004: 169). The

threat of security, however, is not deemed important to the process of integration by all of the federalist scholars (Vollaard 2008: 6). Søren Dosenrode describes Riker as belonging to the Realist school of federalism and mentions the Liberal school, to which he counts scholars like M. Burgess, D.J. Elazar, and K.C. Wheare. Following the latter school of federalism, Dosenrode describes four factors that might lead to international regional integration: security, prosperity (economic wealth), commonness (cultural likeness), and geographic proximity (Dosenrode,2010:13). These factors are not seen as leading to integration directly, however. Several authors stress the importance of strong political leaders, political groups, or elites that are needed to pursue such an interest in order to make integration happen (Dosenrode 2010; Laursen 2010; Elazar 1993; Pinder 1986). Thomas Franck argues that "the principal cause of failure, or partial failure [...] can only be found in the absence of a sufficient political-ideological commitment to the primary concept or value of federation itself" (as cited in Vollaard 2008: 6).

Federalist theory has been criticized by other scholars, mostly not for what it is, but for what it is missing. Some call federalism an ideology (Moravcsik 2005); others underline the supposedly lacking explanatory power of the theory. McKay focuses on the validity of one of the basic assumptions, namely by challenging the idea that security issues/threats are the core factor leading to regional integration (2004: 170). The author also addresses problems with the assumption that (federal) integration sees the starting point in interstate bargains, which are mostly presumed to provide some kind of a constitutional setting which regulates all relationships between the different levels of governments. This of course is heavily criticized by neofunctionalist scholars who believe in a gradual integration process. As has been shown above, all of these critical points have been addressed within the field of

federalism itself, which makes it harder to speak of a single federalist theory with clearly defined assumptions and predictions.

In summary, Federalist theory assumes that an elite group is the main driving force behind integration. In this pluralist/civil society approach, the role of national governments is disputed. Some authors claim the presence of a pressure group, or elite, to be most important in the integration process; others argue that no cooperation takes place without a strong political leadership pushing for it. Uniting in these views is the fact that some sort of common ideology has to be present. Federalism assumes integration to be a single event rather than a process, something also called the 'big bang' approach. In a constitutionalizing 'federal bargain', nation states agree on the creation of another level of government, to which a certain amount of power and authority is shifted. This is sought to lead to the creation of a federation, political union, or at least a confederation. While the elite or political leadership groups are seen as the main actors for integration, there can be different reasons next to the previous mentioned common ideology. Most prominent is the notion of a common security threat that unites the participating parties. Also, common culture, geographical proximity and the prospect of economic wealth play a role.

2.3 Overview of Regional Integration Schemes and their effort to consolidate peace and Security in Africa

The issue of regional security has affected regional integration scheme across Africa, the Arab uprising, the security threat in the horn of Africa, the threat in the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa as well as East Africa. The various regional integration schemes responded to threat to peace in their region in different

ways. IGAD and ECOWAS will be review to enable understanding regional security in Africa.

2.3.1 IGAD response to Security Challenges in the horn of Africa

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organisation of seven Eastern African countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, Somali,Djibouti and Uganda) with a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration among its member states. Each of these objectives is challenging, but none more so than the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict in a region that has been steeped in warfare for decades. The current conflicts in the Horn of Africa include civil war in Darfur, protracted state collapse in Somalia, deep hostility and a stalled peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a fragile peace agreement between North and South Sudan, a border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti and periodic bouts of unrest in the Ogaden and Northern Uganda.

The impetus for establishment of IGAD came from UN agencies that saw the urgent need for a regional coordination agency in which to address problems of famine and drought that had devastated Ethiopia and Somalia during 1984 and 1985 (Shaw 1995:12). In 1986, the governments of six countries − Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti − signed up to form the Inter-Governmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD). The name of the organisation betrayed no political ambitions for greater regional integration. IGADD's aspirations were confined to functional co-ordination on environmental protection, food security strategies and natural resource management.

Political relations among IGADD member states remained very limited. Ethiopia and Somalia had not restored relations since the Ogaden war ended in

1978. In the course of the 1980s Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Somalia all endured very violent civil wars in which hundreds of thousands of people were killed. Operating with a zero sum approach to security in the region, the governments routinely sought to destabilise one another: Ethiopia was backing rebel groups in Sudan and Somalia; Sudan and Somalia were backing rebels in Ethiopia. There was no real potential for institution building. However, the inaugural IGADD summit in 1986 was the occasion for a first meeting between President Siad Barre of Somalia and President Mengistu Haile Mariam. In order to concentrate resources on the Ethiopian civil war, Mengistu decided to seek normalisation with Somalia The meeting at IGADD paved the way for the signing of a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia in April 1988 in which both sides agreed to not to assist rebel organisations based in each other's territory.

It is symptomatic of instability in the Horn that five years after its creation, half of IGADD's founding heads of state had been driven from office, all by unconstitutional means. In Sudan, Omar el Bashir seized power in 1989 and established an Islamist government. In Ethiopia, Mengistu was overthrown in 1991 by a dual rebel alliance that split the country into two parts. Meles Zenawi went on to establish a new federal system of government in Ethiopia while supporting Issayas Afewerki to achieve the legal separation of Eritrea as an independent state in 1993. In Somalia, Siad Barre was removed from power by rebel forces in 1991, ushering in a protracted period of state collapse and the emergence of a separatist administration in Somaliland. While Somalia has yet to emerge from crisis, the new leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea quickly consolidated their rule and were keen to exploit the opportunities for regional co-operation. Along with President Museveni in Uganda they set about revitalising IGADD with a much more ambitious mandate, including regional

security. With the accession of newly independent Eritrea to IGADD in 1993 the membership grew to seven. By then, Somalia was no longer a functioning state, so effective membership remained at six, making IGADD one of the smallest African sub-regional groupings.

There were striking differences among the IGADD states. The grouping included Africa's largest country, Sudan, as well as one of its smallest, Djibouti. It contained Africa's oldest country, Ethiopia, as well as its newest, Eritrea. Political histories ranged through continuous civilian rule in Kenya and Djibouti, to protracted state collapse in Somalia and violent conflict as a consistent feature of political life in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea. The region was also a cultural crossroads where North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa meet and where race, ethnicity and religion have all been mobilised for political ends. Because of its strategic location, external powers have frequently intervened in the politics of the Horn and exacerbated local conflicts (Woodward 2003:22)

The characteristics of conflict in the Horn of Africa made the development of peace and security mechanisms both more urgent and more difficult than in other regions of Africa (Khadiagala 2008:54). Conflict had occurred at every level – within states, between states and among proxies as well as between government armies. The use of force to achieve political goals was the regional norm and democratic accountability was largely absent. Regime change was generally achieved through violent rather than peaceful means, just as political grievances were typically addressed through armed rebellion. Inequitable sharing of national resources and lack of representation in the structures of government lay at the root of many of the internal conflicts. Large communities experienced economic marginalisation and political

exclusion, often mirroring ethnic, religious and racial or clan fault lines (Healy 2008:9). Many of the conflicts in the Horn challenged the basis of statehood. This applied to the dynamics of Ethiopia and Eritrea, North and South Sudan and Somalia and Somaliland. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) possibilities of new states emerging from conflict meant that essentially domestic conflicts had foreign policy implications. The advancement of (regional) foreign policy through proxy forces in neighbouring countries was part of the 'normal' pattern of relations, entrenching a system of mutual intervention that had proved highly resilient and survived radical political reconfigurations, including changes of regime (Cliffe 1999:17). With hostile neighbours generally acting as enablers and multipliers of one another's conflicts there were plentiful opportunities for trouble making.

The principles of the OAU, particularly that of 'non-interference', did not guide regional relationships in the Horn. The IGADD member states had been extensively involved in each other's internal wars. Presidents Museveni, Meles and Issayas had all won military victories against the prevailing order and were proud to have overturned abusive regimes. They had no attachment to the stagnant kind of stability that the OAU represented. In his maiden speech to the organisation in 1986, Museveni recalled the deaths of 750,000 Ugandans and spoke of the deep sense of betrayal caused by Africa's silence:

'The reason for not condemning such massive crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of a Member State, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations. We do not accept this reasoning because in the same organs there are explicit laws that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life.' (Kioko 2003: 15)

In 1993, Eritrea's President Issayas spoke in a similar vein at his own inaugural address, saying the OAU had failed the people of Africa and the people of Eritrea. A brief interlude from 1991 to 1993 was marked by the absence of conflict, proxy or otherwise, between IGADD member states. It was a period of internal consolidation in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan. Kenya and Djibouti were both going through a difficult political transition. Uganda and Kenya had mended fences and Museveni was focused on events in Rwanda. Somalia's collapse had produced a severe humanitarian crisis, but this was being addressed through international humanitarian intervention by the US and UN and did not appear to pose a specific threat to regional security.

The decision to expand IGADD's mandate was taken at an extraordinary summit of heads of state and government held in Addis Ababa in April 1995 (Somalia was not represented). The summit established a ministerial committee to propose amendments to the IGADD charter and make recommendations on the restructuring of the organisation. In addition to enhancing co-operation in existing areas of food security, agriculture and environmental protection, they were asked to develop proposals for 'increasing the capacity of countries of the sub-region in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, both inter and intra-state through dialogue' (IGAD 1996). The new mandate was adopted at the next summit meeting in Nairobi, in March 1996, and the organisation was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

IGAD's ambitions were in tune with the spirit of regeneration in the mid 1990s that saw a shift in Africa from functional to security co-operation at the regional level (Adar 2000:21). Considerable hopes were placed in the new

crop of African leaders to tackle Africa's security and development challenges with more success than their predecessors.

2.3.2 IGAD's role in reconciliation and peace-making in Sudan and Somalia

The 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its principles the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights. A new objective was '[to] promote peace and stability in the sub region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue' (IGAD 1996: Art.7g). Member states agreed to: a) take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability; b) establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and c) deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organisations (IGAD 1996: Art.18a)

2.3.3 IGAD and the Sudan Peace Process (1993-2005)

The civil war between North and South Sudan long pre-dated any notion of a regional security organisation in the Horn of Africa. Since the resumption of hostilities in 1983, the Ethiopian government had been a major sponsor of John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). This support was a means to weaken Sudan and served as a counterweight to Sudanese support for rebels in Eritrea and the northern Tigray region of Ethiopia. The overthrow of the Mengistu regime in 1991 transformed political relations across the region and created the conditions in which IGAD engagement began. Ethiopia's new government had been hosted in Khartoum as rebels during the

civil war. On taking power in Addis Ababa they stopped assistance to the SPLA and expelled its leadership to Nairobi. Soon afterwards, an ugly conflict erupted among different Southern Sudanese factions, further weakening the southern rebellion and precipitating a severe humanitarian crisis. Nigeria tried unsuccessfully to mediate. At the IGADD summit in September 1993, President Omar El-Bashir asked his neighbours to help end the conflict. IGADD established a standing committee on peace at heads of state level, with President Moi of Kenya in the chair. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea were well disposed towards Khartoum, while Kenya and Uganda had influence with the SPLA. It appeared, therefore, to have the ingredients for a well-balanced mediation. However, the deadly rivalry within the Horn was soon to resume, tilting the balance firmly towards the SPLA. In January 1994, Eritrea broke off relations with Sudan, accusing Khartoum of sponsoring an Islamist rebel group inside Eritrea. Uganda joined the hostile stance towards Sudan, which also had the active backing of the US. Ethiopia followed suit in 1995 after blame fell on Sudan for an attempt on President Mubarak's life at the Addis Ababa OAU summit. The IGADD Committee continued its negotiations despite the collapse of the regional alliances that had prompted Bashir's request for their involvement. Kenya alone maintained its neutrality and organised proximity talks between representatives of the Sudanese government and the SPLA. At first the Sudanese government rejected use of the term 'self determination' on the agenda as well as any negotiation on the application of Sharia law. After a third round of talks in July 1994, IGADD negotiators drew up the Declaration of Principles calling for a secular state in Sudan and proposing that if this was not possible South Sudan could exercise the rights to self determination under a referendum (El-Affendi 2001; Woodward 2004:10). At the September 1994 IGADD summit, Bashir refused

to accept the Declaration of Principles. However, it remained on the IGADD table and later on provided the foundation upon which the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was negotiated.

2.3.4 IGAD and the Somali Peace Process

The conflict in Somalia was very different to the conflict in Sudan and stemmed from the comprehensive collapse of state institutions. When Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, fighting erupted over control of the capital and degenerated into conflict among multiple clanbased factions. As in Sudan, Somalia's IGAD neighbours were key stakeholders in the conflict. The emergence of Islamism as a political force in Somalia gave the conflict a regional dimension with implications for Ethiopia and Kenya, which both have sizeable Somali communities within their borders. It also excited the interest of the US and other Western powers concerned about the threat of international terrorism. Without a government, Somalia was unable to exercise its membership of IGAD, or indeed any other international forum, and IGAD had difficulty confronting the problem of state breakdown. In 1993 the OAU had assigned Ethiopia the lead role in supporting peace and reconciliation in Somalia, but at that stage peace and security in Somalia was firmly on the UN agenda. The country was then in the throes of significant international interventions (UNITAF, UNOSOMs I and II) designed to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and restore political order. But these had ended in failure in 1995. Ethiopia's desire to see the re-establishment of a government in Somalia stemmed from concerns about the activities of a radical Islamist group that had surfaced in various parts of the country after the downfall of Siad Barre. Al Itihad al Islamia encouraged its followers to put aside the clan divisions that were destroying the country and

embrace Islam as their political goal. They sought the reestablishment of Somalia as an Islamic state governed by 9 Sharia law. Their vision was one that potentially embraced all the Somali peoples of the Horn of Africa, including the Somali communities in Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia therefore had domestic as well as regional interests in a settlement in Somalia. Within IGAD, Ethiopia enjoyed unchallenged diplomatic leadership on Somalia. During 1996/7 Ethiopia followed a twin-track policy. Firstly, they took military action to destroy Al Itihad camps in the Gedo region of Somalia, claiming that these housed Arab and Afghan mujahidin and terrorists linked to Al Qaeda (Tadesse 2002:87). The operations attracted no adverse comment from IGAD, the OAU or the international community at large and Ethiopian forces remained in control of Somali border towns at Luq and Dolo for much of 1997. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi nonetheless warned UN officials that 'Somalia was becoming a major source of instability, with extremists and terrorists operating from there, the scope of which transcended the region' (UNSC 1997: para 26 S/1997/915). On the political track, Ethiopia organised a major reconciliation for Somali factions in the Ethiopian town of Sodere. In January 1997, this produced a 41-member National Salvation Council, headed by Abdulahi Yusuf with five co-chairmen and an 11-member National Executive Committee. Their task was to convene a 465-member national reconciliation conference later that year. The Aideed faction that controlled most of Mogadishu had boycotted the Sodere process. This opened the door for a competing initiative. In March 1998, Egypt and the Arab League jointly hosted Somali reconciliation talks with Aideed and others leading to the Cairo Agreement. This effectively undermined the Sodere peace process. The IGAD summit of March 1998 called for an end to 'the proliferation of competing

initiatives' (a reference to Egypt's activities) that served to undermine the peace process in Somalia (IGAD 1998).

The outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 spelt the end of IGAD's consensual approach to Somali reconciliation. Eritrea was soon reported to be arming the Aideed faction while Ethiopia stepped up assistance to its own allies in Somalia. The Ethiopia-Eritrea war thus contributed to worsening conflict within Somalia, as the two sides sought out proxy partners. As the Ethio-Eritrea war reached its climax in early 2000, Djibouti's new president, Ismail Omah Guelleh, launched his own Somali reconciliation process. The Somali National Peace Conference was held within the framework of IGAD, but included funding and support from external powers including Egypt, Libya and the Gulf states. Guelleh sought a new approach involving traditional and civil Somali leaders rather than the cast of warlords and faction leaders who had dominated previous Somali reconciliation meetings (Interpeace, 2009). The Arta peace process concluded in August 2000 with the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) headed by Abdulqasim Salat Hassan. It had support from Islamists and much of the business community in Mogadishu and close ties with the Djibouti government. IGAD, the OAU and the UN recognised the TNG as the government of Somalia.

The signing of the Sudan and Somali peace agreements in quick succession in late 2004 and early 2005 created an impression that IGAD was proving unusually adept at performing its new conflict-resolution role (Francis, 2006:19). Two IGAD settlements within three months appeared a remarkable accomplishment, especially when taking into consideration that both addressed long and complex conflicts that had defied previous attempts to

secure peaceful settlement. However, a closer examination of the circumstances in which the agreements were achieved points to a more nuanced judgment about IGAD's institutional role.

2.3.5 ECOWAS response to regional peace and Security

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 and comprises fifteen member states (Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia,Sierra Leone, Benin, Nigeria,Togo) and has the total population of 280 million people. ECOWAS was established to address a specific problem with which it was confronted – economic development. Consequently, ECOWAS was originally conceived and established to address the narrow security issues of economic integration as the basis for self-reliance. However, with time, the leaders of the regional body realised that there was a strong nexus between economics and other broader security issues. Hence, in recent years, the organisation has begun to tackle a number of issues which were not originally envisaged to address.

The need to add a defence protocol to the ECOWAS Treaty became imperative in the 1970s when two ECOWAS states became the victims of external aggression. In November 1970, Guinea experienced an attempted invasion by Portuguese mercenaries whist Benin became the target of another failed mercenary attack in January 1977. Added to these cases of external aggression are the military coups prevalent in West Africa during the 1970s. It is in this context of external aggression and internal instability that ECOWAS leaders moved to adopt measures that will safeguard the sub-region's security. The organisation's gradual movement into security started in 1978 when ECOWAS adopted the Non-aggression Treaty which called on member states

to '…refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression' against each other (ECOWAS, 1978). Critics regard this protocol as merely idealistic as it failed to provide an institutionalised response mechanism in the case of a breach. In recognition of this weakness, West African leaders ratified the Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) Protocol at the 1981 Summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone and it came into force in September, 1986. This protocol committed member states to 'give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression' directed at a member state and considered them to constitute 'a threat or aggression against the entirecommunity' (ECOWAS, 1981). The protocol spelt out the circumstances requiring action. These include cases of armed conflict between two or more member states after the failure of peaceful means, and in the case of conflict within a state 'engineered and supported from outside' (art. 4). It created response mechanisms which include a Defence Council, Defence Committee and a sub-regional intervention force: the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). However, this protocol have been criticised for its lack of effective conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms. Moreover it focused heavily on external threats and did not envisage a role for the regional body in the coups that destabilised the sub-region in the 1970s and 1980s, and the internal conflicts that swept through West Africa in the 1990s. Critics regard this as regime protection strategies meant to serve the interest of leaders. In addition to these limitations, the institutions provided for in this protocol were never established. A possible reason responsible for the non-implementation of this protocol lies in Francophone suspicions of Nigerian hegemonic ambitions. These suspicions were further deepened by the protocol's call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all member states. With strong military ties with France, most of the Francophone West African

states depended on their former colonial power for defence and security. In addition to these security concerns, the presence of a rival Francophone security mechanism adversely affected the chances of success of MAD. The *Accord de Non Aggression et d'Assistance en matière de Défense* (ANAD) was signed by Francophone West African states in 1977 following the border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso. Unlike MAD, all the institutions of ANAD including its secretariat were made operational by 1981 (Dokken, 2002).

The Liberian crisis, which started in 1989, represents a critical stage in ECOWAS' transition into security. Faced with unprecedented scale of human suffering and international disengagement from African conflicts, and with no institutions to respond to the conflict ECOWAS was forced to devise ad hoc security mechanisms for keeping the lid on this conflict. In May 1990, ECOWAS established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) charged with the responsibility of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Following weeks of unproductive talks with various faction leaders in July 1990, the SMC took the bold step of establishing and deploying the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) amidst bitter opposition from then rebel leader Charles Taylor and some West African leaders. In neighbouring Sierra Leone, ECOMOG was able to reinstate the ousted President Kabbah and acted as the de facto army in the absence of a national army. In 1998, this ad hoc sub-regional peacekeeping force intervened to restore peace to Guinea Bissau following a revolt in the national army. In December 2002 ECOWAS sent its peacekeeping mission to Cote d'Ivoire and in August 2003, a peacekeeping mission was deployed in Liberia for the second time following the relapse of that country to violent conflict.

The dynamics and unpredictability of conflicts in the sub-region posed significant challenges to the traditional conceptualisation and practice of humanitarian intervention. State collapse, which can be both a cause and consequence of complex political emergencies, have expanded the remits of humanitarian interveners from the 'fire brigade' mentality to efforts aimed at rebuilding collapsed states. ECOWAS peacekeepers therefore established safe havens, shared their limited military supplies with starving civilians and secured humanitarian relief corridors. To varying degrees of success, ECOMOG missions also engaged in peacebuilding efforts, including implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, security sector reform and organizing elections. These interventions also provided an opportunity for the UN to co-deploy with a regional organisation in peacekeeping as was envisaged in the UN charter. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG co-deployed with UN observer missions whilst ECOWAS Missions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire provided rapid deployment forces that were transformed into UN peacekeepers. Despite the problems of co-ordination, logistics and differences in mandate and culture, the co-operation between the UN and ECOWAS allowed each organisation to maximise its comparative advantage whilst working together to resolve the conflicts. Lessons learned in these missions have provided a blueprint for how the UN and regional organisations can work together.

However, despite the achievements and successes outlined above, ECOWAS peacekeeping missions faced serious challenges and setbacks in their attempts to restore peace to war-torn countries. These include the force's lack of capacity to effectively safeguard civilians under their control, poor human rights record of troops, lack of neutrality and complicity in exploiting the natural resources of the host countries (diamonds in Sierra Leone and Timber

in Liberia). ECOWAS missions were also hampered by financial, military and political difficulties. The endemic funding and logistical constraints suffered by ECOMOG severely limited the capacity of the force. Another crucial factor that adversely affected ECOMOG's operations was the rivalry and lack of political consensus between French and English speaking West Africa. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, French-speaking countries were less co-operative with some even supporting rebel groups against ECOMOG. For example, in December 1989, Charles Taylor used Cote d'Ivoire as a staging ground for the invasion of Liberia. A UN Panel of Experts also implicated Burkina Faso in providing support to the RUF and NPFL in Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively (UN, 2001). This lack of political consensus on the part of the mandating body complicated an already complex situation and further derailed efforts to resolve the conflicts. Even amongst troops on the ground, there were differences of approach and strategy. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, whilst Ghana favoured traditional peacekeeping strategies, Nigeria adopted more robust enforcement action. This difference of strategy led to problems with inter-contingent co-ordination and chain of command. These tensions were exacerbated by the lack of effective ECOWAS oversight of both forces and the sub-regional resentment of Nigeria's hegemonic position.

2.4 Stages of Regional Economic Integration

Regional Integration‖ has more than one definition. Some definitions are derived from the European experience of integration, and are therefore not as relevant as in other regions. Roy Ginsberg (2007) defined integration‖ as interstate reconciliation‖: a process by which several states, (which might have been) previously engaged in conflict (political, military or economic), engage with one another in order to come to terms with the past, work through

differences, negotiate and make amends and restitutions as needed, and agree to establish a new relationship based on structural (institutionalized) peace and mutual respect (Ginsberg, 2007:1). His definition describes the process towards the Franco-Germany partnership and the establishment of the ECSC.

Hass (1958) defined (political) integration as the process whereby political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end of a process of political integration is a new political community (Haas, 1958:16). His definition focuses on the political institutions and supranational developments which are present in Europe rather than Asia and Africa. In this definition, independent states may eventually join together into a federation, which is defined as an institutional arrangement involving two or more levels of government, with a formal division of authority specifying the powers and sources of revenue. Both levels of governments act directly in some ways on the citizens. An alternative to federation is confederation, defined as an institutional arrangement where a group of sovereign entities form a common government for limited purposes. The common government has no independent sovereignty and does not act directly on citizens. The EU is a mixture of federation and confederation, but not fully one or the other (Siaroff, 2009:166-170

Balassa (1987) defined economic integration both as a process and as a state of affairs. This distinction, although lacking theoretical relevance, is useful for empirical purposes. Considered as a process, economic integration comprises the set of political and economic measures "designed to eliminate discrimination between economic units that belong to different national states" (Balassa 1987:43).

Interpreted as a state of affairs, "it represents the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies" The process of economic integration, then, can be regarded as the path that is followed between decreasing levels of economic discrimination among countries.

There are five levels. Free trade area is the lowest extent of national integration, Political union the greatest. Each level of integration incorporates the properties of those levels that precede it. Based on the above definitions, this research defines regional integration‖ as a multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-stage process leading to the intensification of inter-state links, the increase of regional arrangements, and the formation and evolvement of a region. It may be brought about by force, the need for security in the face of a common external threat, common values and goals, and the desire to promote peace and improve their quality of life more quickly by working together (McCormick, 2005:12). It may also be pushed by the globalization of economic activity, the production and marketing of goods and services (Coleman & Underhill, 2002:93), and efforts to adapt to globalization. It includes both informal and formal reconciliation among states (national and sub-national governments), government officials, and private actors in developing institutions, policies, day-by-day coordination, and cooperation in various issues which may differ from region to region. As a multi-level process, it could be top-down negotiations among states leading to formal projects, and also could be bottom-up processes originating from economies and societies leading to increasing interdependence.

Bela Balassa (1961) defined a free trade area as a region where tariffs and quantitative restrictions between the participating countries are abolished, but each member retains its own tariffs against nonmembers. Establishing a

customs union involves suppression of discrimination and the equalization of tariffs in trade with nonmember countries. A higher form, a common market, requires that both trade restrictions and restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree of harmonization of national economic policies. Belassa's final stage of total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and counter-cyclical policies, and requires the setting-up of a supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states (Balassa, 1961:2). However, one should separate out monetary integration from these other factors. The following table shows the consequent six stages.

1. **Free Trade Area**

a. Countries remove all barriers to trade among members, but each country determines its own barriers against non-members.

b. Policies differ greatly against non-member countries from one country to another. Countries in a free trade area also establish a process to resolve trade disputes between members.

2. Customs Union

a. Countries remove all barriers to trade among members but erect a common trade policy against non-members.

b. Differs from a free trade area in that members treat all non-members similarly. Countries might also negotiate as a single entity with other supranational organizations such as the WTO.

3. Common Market

a. Countries remove all barriers to trade and the movement of labour and capital between themselves, but erect a common trade policy against non-members.

b. Adds the free movement of important factors of production such as people and cross-border investment. Requires cooperation in economic and labour policy, so is very difficult to attain.

4. Economic Union

a. Countries remove barriers to trade and the movement of labour and capital, erect a common trade policy against non-members, and coordinate their economic policies.

b. Requires members to harmonize their tax, monetary, and fiscal policies, create a common currency, and concede a certain amount of sovereignty to the supranational organization.

5. Political Union

a. Countries coordinate aspects of economic and political systems.

b. Members accept a common stance on economic and political policies regarding non-member nations. Nations are allowed a degree of freedom in setting certain political and economic policies within their territories.

Table 2.1: Stage of Economic Integration by Balassa

	No tariff or quotas	Common external tariff	Free flow of factors	Harmonization of economic policies	Harmonization of economic & monetary policies	Unification of policies, political institutions
FTA	√					
Customs Union	√	√				
Common market	√	√	√			
Economic Union	√	√	√	√		
Economic and Monetary Union	√	√	√	√	√	
Total economic integration	√	√	√	√	√	√

Source: Nye, 1968

The table 2.1 above explains stages of regional economic integration as outlined by Balassa in 1961. ECCAS in still at the second stage which is customs union where there is common external tariff but as for free flow of factors of production, that is found in ECCAS vision 2025.

CHAPTER THREE

OVERVIEW OF ECCAS

3.1 The creation of ECCAS: Out of hibernation

This chapter explores ECCAS from its creation in 1983 and examine the various structures of ECCAS as well as it security structure. The ten member states of ECCAS. It will also examine the security structure of ECCAs and the level cooperation amongst member states.

In 1981, the leaders of the already existing Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) agreed to establish a wider economic community of

Central African States with the goal of creating a common market (Africa Capacity Building Foundation, 2008:255). Two years later, in 1983, ECCAS was launched. The member states included all members of the UDEAC (the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea), as well as the members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States – Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire (later Democratic Republic of Congo). São Tomé was also an initial member. Angola joined ECCAS in 1999, while Rwanda left in 2007 (although Rwanda presently has an observer status).

Figure 3.1: ECCAS Member States



Source: www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-commuity-central-african-states

Figure 3.1 above indicates the list of ECCAS member states as well as their Geographical location. ECCAS originally had eleven member States. Some of these States such as Cameroon and the Island of Sao Tome and Principe are geographically located in West Africa rather than in Central Africa and this may also explain the reason why some of these States does not put more effort in the success of the regional integration scheme.

Figure 3.2: ECCAS revised map without Rwanda



Source: Adapted from Meyer, (2011)

Figure 3.2 shows the reviced map of ECCAS with Rwanda, originally, Rwanda was a member of ECCAS and it is geographically located in Central Africa Sub-region. In 2007, Rwanda left ECCAs in favour of East African Coimmunity (EAC). However, in 2010, Rwanda was given an observer status after showing interest in rejoining ECCAS.

ECCAS – in Central Africa better known by its French acronym *Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEEAC) – has its headquarters located in Libreville, Gabon. ECCAS formally became functioning in 1985 but it was not long until the organisation lost its momentum. Conflict in member states and a lack of financial and other commitments from member states made cooperation and integration within ECCAS come to a grinding halt. In between 1992 and 1998, the organisation became completely inactive. Its structures remained but slowly decayed, forming nothing more than an ECCAS shell.

In the beginning of 1998, an Extra-Ordinary Summit of ECCAS was held in Libreville, during which the Heads of State and Government committed to bring the organisation out of hibernation. It was decided that ECCAS would be restructured and its agenda be refined to give new life to the organisation. In 1999, four new priority areas for the work of the organisation were identified. In light of how the region had been negatively affected by the many conflicts taking place during the 1990's, one of these priorities was to enhance the region's capabilities for peace, security and stability. This was considered a prerequisite for the economic and social development of Central Africa. The other priorities were to develop the physical, economic and monetary integration of the region; to develop a culture of human integration; and to establish an autonomous financing mechanism for ECCAS. At this time, Angola, which had previously carried observer status within ECCAS, decided to become a full member. ECCAS also signed the protocol on relations between the African Economic Community (AEC) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which confirmed ECCAS as the major REC in Central Africa. In 2008, it was decided that CEMAC was to merge with ECCAS, however when this will happen is another matter. A merger will be

easier in certain areas, such as peace and security where ECCAS has a clear and recognised lead. As the principal organisation for security cooperation in Central Africa, ECCAS soon came to constitute the regional contribution to the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Architecture. Structures within ECCAS for this purpose were set up in the early 2000's (see chapter 4 on Peace and Security). Other than the need to address the degradation of peace and security in the region, the decision of the Heads of State and Government of ECCAS to establish regional peace and security structures was informed by the APSA-developments at the continental level. The establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) thus contributed to give new life to ECCAS.

Among the five RECs and mechanisms that form part of the ASF, ECCAS is (the REC with the lowest financial capacity, with an annual budget of USD 18 million. ECCAS is to be financed through an import tax of 0.4% between the member states, however it is questionable if it is actually being collected on a general basis. There have been a lot of difficulties in collecting funding from member states, with only some countries being more regular contributors (such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea). In addition, ECCAS suffers great shortages in terms of human resources, in particular as regards highly-qualified professional staff. (Meyer, 2008:11) Even after the re-launch of ECCAS in 1998, a dynamic pace has yet to catch on in this Community. In the absence of a critical mass of a regular professional staff and financial resources, ECCAS has failed to develop short-, medium- and long-term strategic plans as well as the requisite financial programming and management. Moreover, ECCAS neither has employee job descriptions nor job classifications. Certain observers see ECCAS as an organisation that imply

continues to grope in the dark. The organisation's capacities, on the one hand, and its visions and missions on the other, do not fully correspond to each other.

3.2 Organisational structure of ECCAS

Regarding ECCAS' formal structure, the key organs are *the Conference of Heads of State and Government*, *the Council of Ministers*, and *the General Secretariat*. There is also a *Court of Justice*, which is not yet operational. In addition, the ECCAS structure encompasses a *Consultative Commission* and *Specialised Technical Committees.* The ECCAS framework that deals specifically with peace and security, i.e. *COPAX* and associated, are addressed in the next section. The chairmanship of ECCAS is meant to rotate every year (following alphabetic order), in conjunction with the envisaged yearly meeting of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, however, this has not been the case. The current chair is Chad, which took over from the DRC in October 2009 (Trust Africa, 2012:97)

Figure 3.3: Key Institution of ECCAS



Source: ECCAS General Secretariat

3.2.1 The Conference of Heads of State and Government

The Conference of Heads of State and Government (henceforth referred to as 'the Conference') defines ECCAS' general policy and orientation, and controls the functioning of the other ECCAS institutions. It is the organisation's supreme decision-making body, including for issues relating to peacekeeping, the consolidation, the promotion and the restoration of peace and security (protocol Art 8). Hence, 'the Conference' decides on actions to be taken by ECCAS organs. 'The Conference' is to meet once a year in an ordinary session, but can also convene extraordinary sessions. Despite these ambitions, 'the Conference' has so far never managed to meet on a yearly basis. However, since 2005, it has convened more regularly, with meetings in 2005, 2007 and 2009. No meeting was carried out in 2011.

3.2.2 The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is in charge of the functioning and the development of ECCAS. Among other things, it formulates recommendations for 'the Conference', directs the activities of the other ECCAS institutions, and submit the budget to 'the Conference'. The Council consists of ministers from each member state. There is a contact ministry for ECCAS in each member state, although different states have appointed different ministries to be in charge of this task, depending on what focus they put on ECCAS. Certain states have representatives from their Trade Ministry, others from their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and again others the Ministry for Development Cooperation etc. The Council of Ministers is foreseen to meet twice a year, and if there is a need, in extraordinary sessions. (CEEAC, *Institutions de la Communaute* Art.12-14)

3.2.3 General Secretariat

The ECCAS General Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General, who is elected for four years (renewable one). It is foreseen that he/she is assisted by three deputy Secretaries-General, each of whom is to be in charge of the General Secretariat's three (four to be) departments. However, currently, only one department within the General-Secretariat is headed by a deputy Secretary-General (the Department for Fiscal, Economic and Monetary Integration).(African Capacity Building Foundation,2008:264) The deputy Secretary-Generals for the Department for Human Integration, Peace and Security and for the Department for Human Resources, Projects and Budgets left ECCAS in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The General Secretariat is tasked to ensure the execution of the projects and programmes of ECCAS. This includes preparing and carrying out the decisions and the directives of 'the

Council' and the orders of the Council of Ministers, to elaborate and execute the budget, to establish the annual work programme of ECCAS, to report on the activities that have been accomplished, and to undertake studies on how to achieve the ECCAS' objectives.

Figure 3.4: General secretariat of ECCAS, Organisational structure



Source: adapted from Africa Capacity Building Foundation, 2008

3.2.4 The Consultative Commission

The Consultative Commission consists of experts designated by the member states. It can be charged with researching and examining specific issues or projects in detail for the Council of Ministers. The Specialised Technical Commissions are set up in application of annex protocols of the ECCAS treaty; they can also be created by 'the Conference'. (ECCAS Treaty Art 23-26)

3.2.5 The Executive-Secretariat

ECCAS General-Secretariat organigramme was adopted in June 2009 (see Annex 2). However, this should rather be seen as a temporary organizational chart that needs to be reviewed to adapt into its expanded vision, mission objectives and development challenges, as well as to provide an enabling internal environment for the implementation of its mandate. Furthermore, out of the different units, many are poorly resourced or only exist on paper. (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2008:277)

3.2.6 The Human Rights and Democracy Centre and network of Central African parliamentarians (REPAC)

In addition to the organs above, ECCAS established a Human Rights and Democracy Centre, which was inaugurated in 2001, as well as adopted a protocol on a network of Central African parliamentarians (Réseau des Parlementaires de la CEEAC, REPAC) in 2002.(Trust Africa,2012:93) The Human Rights and Democracy Centre could come to play an important role in preventing conflict due to its primary aim of promoting human rights, democratic practices and good governance. The centre held its first meeting in Libreville, Gabon, at the beginning of September 2001 and it also seeks to ensure civil society involvement in ECCAS's peace-building efforts.(Cosme & Fiacre,2001:12). The purpose of REPAC is to give advice on matters related to the ECCAS treaty on issues regarding, amongst others, Human Rights, citizenship, minority rights, gender issues, the environment, science and technology, education, public health and energy. REPAC will also be authorised to make statements on revisions of the ECCAS treaty as well as free mobility within the region. (International Democracy Watch, 2011:21) REPAC is intended to be located in Equatorial Guinea and its 50 seats will be filled by five representatives from each of the ten Member States' national

parliaments, elected on a five-year basis. REPAC has taken long to set up and is still not very active. A major challenge in its establishment has been to secure financial support for the project as ECCAS itself has not been able to include the venture in its budget. In addition, the process of ratifying the REPAC protocol has also been slow and as a result the inauguration of the Network has repeatedly been rescheduled and postponed. Despite these challenges, the structure for the REPAC Secretariat were set up in 2010 and since then a series of meetings and workshops have been organised to gather and educate parliamentarians from ECCAS member states regarding regionalisation and ECCAS community policies while the final inauguration of the Network is awaited. (International Democracy Watch, 2011:23)

The eventual inauguration is hoped to facilitate improved integration in the ECCAS region and soften the current intergovernmental nature of the organisation. Whether this will actually happen is dependent on the willingness of the member states to relinquish its powers as the main decision making entities in the region.

3.3 Security structure of ECCAS

3.3.1 Council for Peace and Security (COPAX)

Different structures exist to handle peace and security issues within ECCAS. With ECCAS venturing into the realm of security cooperation it was decided in 1999 at the Yaounde submit that the organisation would set up a *Council for Peace and Security* (*COPAX*) with a set of technical organs. COPAX resembles the structure of the Council of Ministers, but is instead composed by ministers at the member states' Foreign Ministries, Defence Ministries, Interior Ministers or the like. The council is chaired by the Foreign Minister of the member state that chairs the Conference. COPAX was created as the main

structure for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa. (CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* Art 4) It is in charge of monitoring and execution of decisions taken by the Conference, and is to exercise any other mandate that the Conference can give. The Protocol relating to COPAX underlines sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs as guiding principles. Yet the ECCAS member states align against conflict in the region; foremost through early warning and conflict prevention. When needed, civil or military engagement are promoted to maintain and restore peace. Among the objectives of COPAX are to prevent, manage and regulate conflicts and to undertake activities of promotion and consolidation of peace and peacekeeping.

Furthermore, COPAX are to develop confidence-building measures between the member states, to promote policies for peaceful regulations of disputes, to implement pertinent measures relating to non-aggression and to mutual assistance in defence, facilitate mediation efforts during crises, ensure common approaches to such problems as refugees and internally displaced people, as well as transnational crime and arms trafficking.Moreover, the cooperation against terrorism, border crimes, and work against illegal drug-trade and trade of weapons are also part of the preventive work. . (CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* Art 5-6).

The technical organs of the COPAX are *the Central African conflict early warning system (MARAC), the Defence and Security Commission (CDS)* and *the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC).* The standing orders for these organs were adopted in 2002.

Figure 3.5: COPAX and it technical organs



Source: Elowson & Wiklund, 2011

3.3.2 The Defence and Security Commission (CDS)

The **CDS** is a technical planning and advisory body made up of chiefs of staff of national armies and commanders-in-chief of police and gendarmerie forces from the different Member States, as well as experts from Foreign/Defence/Interior Ministries. Its role is to plan, organize and provide advice to COPAX and other decision-making bodies of the community in order to initiate military operations if needed. The CDS is one of the most important organs of the COPAX, it is in charge of the conception of military or operational strategies of COPAX. Its functions are clearly expressed in articles 14 to 16 of the Protocol relating to COPAX. Due to this, the CDS among other things, examines all the administrative, technical and logistical

questions and evaluates the needs for operations relating to the maintenance of peace. It is in charge of the examination of the strategy on the fight against criminality in the sub-region. Moreover, the military activities of ECCAS are organised by the CDS under the political authority of heads of states and governments. The CDS also assists the Council of Ministers in several activities in respect of the dispositions prescribed by article 14. On 17 June 2002, the member states adopted the standing orders of the CDS. This instrument is the main text that provides details on the mode of operation of the CDS. Pursuant, to its article 10, the CDS shall have one Bureau: The Bureau of the Defence and Security Commission and this Bureau shall consist of one Chairperson, one Vice-Chairperson and two Rapporteurs. The meetings of the CDS are convened by the serving Chairperson of the Conference of the heads of states and governments and these meetings are held in the state which ensures the chairpersonship or in any other member state if circumstances so require.

The daily management of the peace and security issues and programming takes place at the General Secretariat by the *Department of Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability (DIHPSS*). Among other things, the department includes an electoral unit and a unit dealing with early warning.

Figure 3.6: Structure of the Department of Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability



Source: Elowson & Wiklund, 2011

3.3.3 The Central African Early Warning system (MARAC)

The Central African Early Warning system (MARAC) is responsible for observing and monitoring developments pertaining to risk for (and causes of) imminent and long-term conflict in the sub-region. The objective is to facilitate decision making by ECCAS regarding the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The activities of MARAC consist of collecting and analysing data on security concerns and submitting reports to the Secretary General, the CDS, and other concerned ECCAS officials. Daily press reviews,

as well as weekly and monthly reports are currently provided. Ahead of ECCAS meetings, geopolitical and security analyses are also produced to serve the CDS and others concerned. Some of the briefs are made public, but as the information can be sensitive most of them are not. Distribution of the reports to member states' ambassadors and to external partners, does take place though.

Around five staff are based at the MARAC early warning centre, in Libreville, Gabon and three of these five are finance by the EU. MARAC foresees the establishment of one sub-office in each member state, to be in charge of observation to be fed into the data base of the early warning centre. However, currently, only five out of ten member states are active; the DRC, Burundi, the CAR, Cameroon and Chad. In these countries, 'decentralised correspondents' are placed, from where they are to report on incidents directly to the MARAC in Libreville. Two thirds of these correspondents are NGOs, while the rest are government officials. The above countries have been prioritised since they suffer most from conflicts. The remaining five countries - Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé & Principe and Angola - are in the process of being connected to MARAC. (Elowson & Wiklund, 2011:50) There have been difficulties relating to management issues when it comes to installing decentralised correspondents in the various countries. An assessment is being carried out of the correspondents' network, in order to see how these issues can be addressed. Trainings have also been conducted throughout 2009 and 2010, in order to advance country profile schemes, to put in place a detailed organigramme, and to identify needs concerning analysis methodology, communication with the decentralised correspondents and technical installations for the situation room. Hence, priorities for the coming

years have been established and the work to realise them have been initiated (Elowson & Wiklund, 2011:55)

In principle, after the recipients of the reports have been alerted, the COPAX or 'the Conference' should be briefed and proceed by discussing suitable action to take, such as preventive diplomacy (for instance sending a fact-finding or mediating mission), or, eventually, preparing for a peacekeeping mission. This would be early warning leading to early response. In practice, the decision making process is not yet developed to this extent within ECCAS. MARAC started to function on a basic level in 2007, when initial recruitment began. The ambition was to have MARAC fully operational by the end of 2010. However, several challenges remain, including grave financial and human limitations, which have largely paralysed the mechanism. Primarily, the analysis capacity of MARAC needs to be developed in order for the early warning mechanism to be able to play its intended role as support to decision-making. (fanta,2009:7) MARAC does not have the resources to send observers/data collectors to a hot spot. Installing the decentralised correspondents in all member states is another crucial element for MARAC to function properly. To make those correspondents in place operational, it is necessary to provide means and devices needed for them to carry out their work. This includes on-the job training, which commenced in March 2010. Apart from these decentralised correspondents, some of which are NGOs, there is no systematic way of utilising local resources for data collection. Capacity to manage relations with the correspondents and to adequately handle the contents of their reporting also needs to be improved at the MARAC early warning centre in Libreville. (ECCAS official 1&2 in Elowson & Wiklund, 2011:61)

Furthermore, collaboration with the General Secretariat and COPAX needs to be advanced. Another key priority is to develop an analysis methodology. For instance, MARAC can send a news/or warning flash when something urgent takes place, but there is no standardised way of reporting incidents. Neither is there a standardized method for sending information to the CEWS in Addis Ababa. In addition, there have been technological challenges regarding the communication. There is also a need to develop a system of organisation, classification and management of the information that MARAC handles.

The legal bases for ECCAS coming up with a Central Early warning system can be traced back to one of the structure of APSA which is the *Continental Early Warning System* (CEWS), established to detect and support the prevention of conflicts. This centrally located continental-wide early warning system is currently being established at AU headquarters (Bogland et al,2008:18). The CEWS will be linked to *regional early warning systems (REWS)* in each of the five APSA regions (North Africa, West Africa, Central frica, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa) There are ten officially recognised African organisations and mechanisms feeding into APSA and each of these can establish regional early warning systems feeding into the CEWS.

MARAC shares information with CEN-SAD and IGAD as these organisations' early warning centres overlap regarding Chad, the CAR and Sudan. Representatives from each of these organisations meet on occasion. However, MARAC does not exchange any information with MONUSCO (nor did it exchange information with MINURCAT) . (ECCAS official 1&3 in Elowson & Wiklund, 2011:61).

3.3.4 Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC)

FOMAC is generally viewed as being ECCAS' African Standby Force (ASF) contribution. The issue of how to regard FOMAC, however, is not entirely clear and it could be argued that FOMAC should be understood from a two-folded perspective. Apart from being solely the Central African contribution to the ASF, FOMAC can be seen – according to ECCAS original documents – as a peacekeeping force purely within the scope of ECCAS and being originally an initiative of the ECCAS member states. With time, FOMAC has developed to be part of the APSA. (Hull et al,2011:30)

The idea of an ECCAS standby force was first raised in the Mutual Assistance Pact and in the Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council in Central Africa (COPAX), dating back in 2000. The standing orders of FOMAC, detailing the objectives and functioning of the force, were then adopted in 2002. (Cilliers,2008:40). After the establishment of the AU and the development of AU plans to establish an African Standby Force, the member states' Defence Chiefs of Staff met in 2003 to discuss how ECCAS could create a brigade-size peacekeeping force to support this initiative and how the ideas of FOMAC would fit into this. The meeting recommended that military planners from each of the ECCAS states form a group to work out the details for the force. They also suggested the establishment of a joint peacekeeping training centre and military exercises every two years, the first of which to took place in Chad.

Between 2003 and 2004, a number of meetings were held at the level of experts, the Defence Chiefs of Staff and COPAX to adopt structures and action plans for FOMAC.201 In 2004, the Protocol relating to COPAX entered into force (Cilliers & Malan,2005:17) However, all COPAX tools – FOMAC included – took time to define and prepare. By 2006, the

establishment of FOMAC started to pick up pace, as regional staff were appointed. A first ECCAS peacekeeping operation was undertaken in the form of MICOPAX in 2008.

ASF policy framework is a key point of departure for FOMAC's mandate and procedures, describing its continental commitments towards the APSA evolution. Further mandate and procedures for deployment are stated in the ECCAS Mutual Assistance Pact, the Protocol relating to COPAX and in the Standing Orders for FOMAC According to the ECCAS Framework documents, FOMAC is to "carry out peace, security and humanitarian assistance missions" (FOMAC, art 23-24).The missions for FOMAC are specified as follows:

- Observation and monitoring
- Peace-keeping and restoration of peace
- Humanitarian intervention following a humanitarian disaster
- Enforcement of sanctions as provided for by existing regulations
- Preventive deployment
- Peace-building, disarmament and demobilization;
- Policing activities, including control of fraud and organized crime
- Any other operations as may be mandated by the Conference (FOMAC, art 23)

The decision to deploy a FOMAC mission would have to come from 'the Conference'. When there is a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region, 'the Conference' convenes an urgent meeting and activates the appropriate COPAX mechanism. The request to 'the Conference' could come through an inviting member state, at the initiative of the General Secretary, or at the request of the AU or the UN. Thus, FOMAC can be deployed under

three separate arrangements: as a standalone ECCAS intervention in an ECCAS member state, as an AU mission – as ASF – with an AU mandate, or by putting contingents of FOMAC at the disposal of the UN. Nothing would prevent that a standalone ECCAS mission is also supported through an AU Peace and Security Council Resolution and UNSC resolution; as such support would be sought. 'The Conference' is the ECCAS body deciding on appropriate measures for prevention, management and regulation of conflicts, particularly for any military action and the establishment of FOMAC. Efforts are made to take decisions to intervene by consensus, but if no unanimous agreement can be found, the decision can be taken with a two thirds majority of votes. (CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* , Art 26) 'The Conference' determines the mandate for military operations and nominates the Special Representative, the Force Commander, and the Head of Military Staff (Chef d'etat major). According to the ECCAS framework documents, FOMAC can be deployed in the case of :

A) Threat of aggression or conflict in all member states

B) Conflict between two or more member states

C) Internal conflict, which either threatens to provoke a humanitarian catastrophe, or constitutes a serious threat for peace and security in the subregion

D) Attempt of reversal of constitutional institutions of a member state (coup d'etat)

E) Any other situation assessed as preoccupying by 'the Conference'. (CEEAC, *Protocole relative au Conseil de Paix et de Securite del'Afrique Centrale* , Art 25)

As concerns ECCAS engagement in an AU intervention, the mandating decision would come from the AU Peace and Security Council. Once an ASF

peace support operation has been mandated, the mission would be placed under the command and control of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC). Apart from appointing the SRCC, the Chairperson would also appoint a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police and a Head of the Civilian Component. Thus, once deployed, the regional standby force (e.g. FOMAC) contribution would come under AU command and control as an ASF. In this arrangement, ECCAS responsibility would be on the one hand, force generation and preparation, and on the other hand, provision of planning, logistic and other support during ASF deployment (Elowson & MacDermott,2010:48).

The Standing Orders specify that FOMAC logistics support shall be provided by COPAX during the engagement period. However, the FOMAC may receive logistic support from any other institution of a donor state, subject to the consent of the chairman of the Conference. In the event of a FOMAC engagement on behalf of the UN or the AU, the logistics shall be provided by these organisations.

Regarding financing of missions, it is foreseen that all COPAX member states shall contribute to the financing of all operations. However, also external partners may contribute financially. All member states contributing troops shall pre-finance the cost of military operations for the first three months of deployment. Beyond that period, COPAX shall take over. The pre-financing is to be refunded by the COPAX budget. In the event of FOMAC engagement on behalf of the UN or the AU, the funding shall be provided by these organizations.

A preliminary list of troop pledges was put together in February 2008 in ‘the Catalogue of units 2010 for the first regional standby force of FOMAC’. In

this document, the ambition to set up a standby brigade of approximately 5000 personnel is expressed. In terms of force levels, the Catalogue divides the standby force in four tactical groupings, which each are to consist of 1200 personnel and each to include police, civilian and military components (where the latter would consist of, among other things, one infantry battalion, one command/service support company, one squadron of light tanks, one artillery support battery**,** one engineer section, one helicopter squadron and one logistics company). The troop pledges were initially to be realised by 2010. Even if the member states committed to providing the personnel already in 2008, the pledges have not yet been entirely realised,

The FOMAC planning element (PLANELM), currently with 20 employed staff, has been established in Libreville. Two of these staff are police officers (they are soon to be joined by a third) and two civilians (one of whom is a legal advisor). A regional logistics base for peacekeeping operations is to be located in Doula, Cameroon, or/and in Angola, while a medical facility – a training institute for military doctors – is being developed in Libreville (Kinzel, 2008:21)

FOMAC include general staff from its different member states, which are to be appointed by consensus. Concerning the military component, FOMAC is in addition to ground troops – to include sufficient air and naval assets. The standby force is not a formed military troop assembled in one place, but made up of contingents of national armies which are to be called upon by COPAX in response to an emergency.

Since most of the ECCAS troops contributing countries are former French colonies, the intention is that police would be constituted by gendarmerie for robust missions and may include civilian police where the mission allows this.

According to the Catalogue of units, the standby force would need six formed police units, as well as a police company able to perform desert operations (mounted police capacity).

Concerning the civilian component, the Standing Orders state that "FOMAC may receive reinforcements from civilian units composed of NGOs and associations authorized by the ECCAS General Secretariat".(Cilliers,2008:32). The Catalogue of units mentions in general terms that 'civilian elements to be provided at demand', and that civilian observers are to be identified and formed. Nevertheless, the structure of the civilian component is not well defined at the moment.

Notably, FAMAC has been having series of challenges, in terms of training, ECCAS disposes of a number of centres of excellence. However, these are national centres, whose curricula are currently not in line with international training standards. The issue at stake is whether these centres can adapt their curriculum to be suitable as APSA training institutes. Seven centres in the ECCAS region are presently on the AU's list, and hence considered to be engaged as APSA training institutes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. A definite assessment of which of these centres will be used awaits the finalisation of a needs analysis on the ECCAS training needs. The Cours Superior Interarmées de Défense (CSID) in Yaoundé/Cameroon seems to have been accepted to be used at the strategic level, while Ecole d'Etat-Major de Libreville (EEML) in Libreville/Gabon is appropriate for the operational level. Concerning tactical level training, there is a school (EFOFAA) in Luanda/Angola, however its profile is considered as too tactical and rather meant for the start of military carriers. Another option is in Bata/Equatorial Guinea, but this is a basic navy academy, not in line with FOMAC needs.

There are also plans to further develop a police force training centre (EIFORCES) in Awae/Cameroon. In addition, smaller national centres such as the one for medical training (Libreville, Gabon) and the one for engineers (Brazzaville, Congo), could play a regional role in due course. COPAX is responsible for coordinating training programmes for the conditioning of FOMAC contingents (Elowson & Wiklund,2011:58).

FOMAC was conceived already in 2000, progress only started to take off around 2006. However, chronic underfunding from the start, and the substantial conflicts in the region in the following years, continued to prevent the efforts to establish the regional brigade. Although a national division of labour has been made between individual countries of the region, the effective realisation of the regional standby brigade (as well as the ideas concerning the development of a Rapid Deployment Force) still faces many technical challenges(Kinzel,2008:21).

However, with the latest multinational training exercise, 'Kwanza', which took place in Angola in May/June 2010, progress has been noted and the pace in establishing FOMAC has picked up. With Kwanza, leadership for FOMAC was taken: Angola took a great part of the responsibility and especially the real life support, such as logistics, communication and network assets, deployment and supply. Most of the funding was also secured by Angola. Observers note that if Angola did not take this role, the Kwanza exercise would probably never have been realised (CEEAC, *Rapport Bilan et Retour d'Experience de la Composante police/gendamerie del'Exercise KWANZA 2010*)

Kwanza was a key exercise because it intended to serve to certify FOMAC as an APSA brigade. The exercise (following the AU scenario 4) addressed all

levels of implementation of an integrated mission – political, strategic, operational and tactical, and, being a multidimensional and multifunctional exercise it took into account different activities: political/diplomatic action (civilian component), stabilisation through observation and military action (military component: observers and land, sea and air troops), consolidation through police/gendarme action (police component) and humanitarian action (civilian component).(Meyer, 2010:27) It was the first time that an inter-service exercise at brigade level took place, where the whole cycle of a peace support operation was taken into account. Some observers, however, question whether this was really training for a peace support operation or rather a standard military exercise, and hence, whether certification was actually feasible. For instance, no civil society took part. On the other hand, the exercise was well organised, and certain observers judge it on the whole as a success for ECCAS. Kwanza was a major effort, and the organization proved that they are able to deploy and train a force of 3700 troops by its own. The certification report issued by ECCAS in October 2010 concluded that "*FOMAC, an ASF component, has been certified and can be used in peace keeping missions, in the framework of a multinational and multidimensional force*". This certification, however, is only an internal ECCAS assessment, and is not accepted at the AU level. It has been suggested that most of the objectives of the Kwanza exercise were attained.

Meanwhile, one observer noted that the standard of the exercise was very low. In particular, this observer highlighted that FOMAC staff still have to improve capabilities, especially weaknesses regarding the organisation and planning, the Communication & Information Systems battalion (CIS), command and control structure, logistics, real life support and the dissemination of information. In short, FOMAC is far from the UN basic standard. Regarding

FOMAC operability, the military infantry battalions are assessed as more or less acceptable, while others are still in need of progressing.

Lastly, in contrast to the (relative) delivery of the military component, it was more difficult for the police/gendarme and civilian components to perform during Kwanza. Out of the 3700 participants in the exercise, the police personnel amounted to 400 people. The police units are generally in an acceptable state, but this assessment is based on how they reach their national standard and the national specificities, not in terms of being part of an international peacekeeping force. In particular, for the police/gendarmes, the transfer of responsibility during the stabilisation phase to the consolidation phase was a challenge, especially the balance between keeping their specific role and integrating in the multidimensional force. While planning, for the police component, was on the whole assessed as satisfactory during Kwanza, the development of doctrines and operational procedures proved to be aspects where progress need to be made. Clear concepts and doctrines are key for the police to know what they are intended to do. Moreover, police units are not well equipped. (ECCAS International partner 4 in Elowson & iklund,2011:60)
As for the civilian component, Kwanza was the first time that civilian elements were present during an ECCAS peacekeeping exercise. These were largely made up of political and humanitarian actors. Difficulties were noted in terms of the basic conception of civilian component; determining its exact role and taking the specificities of this component into account. It is also difficult for the civilian component to mobilise adequate resources. Generally, civil society, which was largely absent from the exercise, is weak in the Central Africa region and this sector is particularly unorganised in the field of security. This implies difficulties in terms of formulating action plans and to

be able to play a real role. The civilian component is underway trying to find a contractor able to provide a good roster.

A common challenge for all components is the insufficient level of training of the personnel and that they generally keep low standards. During Kwanza, it was apparent that different countries had had different levels of operational preparation and pre-training, which hampered the effectiveness. Doctrines, organisation and equipment were also main areas of difficulty. On a whole, it is therefore difficult for ECCAS to be able to carry out multidimensional peacekeeping exercises. The General Secretariat suffers a severe lack of resources and from over-reliance on external support for almost all activities of FOMAC. Important pillars of FOMAC, such as training centres of excellence, the logistic base and training programmes have for long been at a standstill partly because of non-existing internal resources and competing donor initiatives. Structural challenges such as the weak managerial capacity of DIHPSS, the slow decision-making procedures of COPAX and the inadequate skills of many officers attached to the regional PLANELM especially the strategic planning) further hinder the development of FOMAC.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROOT CAUSES OF SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE ECCAS' REGION

This chapter examine the root causes of the insecurity in the Central African sub-region, the challenges affecting the regions as well as the measures adopted ECCAs to deal with issues of peace and security. Some of the causes of security challenges that will be examine here include State Failure, Politics of the "Belly", Colonial Legacy, transnational criminality, lack of good governance, the presence of arms/rebels groups as well as the manifestation of insecurity in the ECCAS' region.

4.1 State Failure (CAR, DR Congo, Chad, Burundi)

Weak statehood, state failure is a phenomenon use to identify one of the root causes of security challenges in Central Africa Sub-region. Weak statehood refers to a state that is unable to provide border security as well as human security for it citizens(Akude,2009:11).

Rotberg (2004) surmises a broadly accepted classification of state failure. It relies on the basic hypothesis of the state existing "to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within the designated parameters (borders)."(Rotberg, 2004:2) Within this framework the state operates in a wide frame of "dimensions" structured by the specific situation in which it is acting but as well relying on the "hierarchy of political goods." (Rotberg,2004:4) "The supply of security" turns out to be the most important one which this is lacking in many of ECCAS's state. Beyond human security (with the notion of territorial security), other political goods including "methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating […] norms and […] mores" and "the right to participate" are central ones a state is responsible to offer.

Going further “medical and health care”, “schools and educational instruction”, “roads, railways, harbours and other physical infrastructures”, “communication networks” and various basic requirements for promising economical activity followed by an equitable “sharing of the environmental commons” are qualified as political goods. (Rotberg,2004:10)

Since it is difficult to measure this hierarchical frame, Akude offers an alternative built on the monopolisation of three instruments, verbatim “violence, taxation (including resource extraction) and law making.” (Akude,2009:11) An example would be a state losing its monopoly of violence in the legal area. As soon as the principle of general rule of law and independent jurisdiction vanishes, or the rule of law becomes irrelevant, patronage politics become easier as the elites create an environment free from accountability and other control mechanisms. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central Africa Republic (CAR) are example in numerous regards.

The logic behind this is obvious as “weak states show a mixed profile.” Hence a state may perform very well in providing security while not providing participation to its citizens such as the case of Chad (Akude,2009:15). In order to distinguish between strong, weak, failed and collapsed states the defined political goods have to be taken into consideration. Whereas strong states “deliver a full range and a high quality of political goods to their citizens”weak states generically underperform in certain aspects. To measure the weakness of states Rotberg suggests various indicators including Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita, the United Nations Development Programme‟s (UNDP) Human Development Index, Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index or the Freedom of the World

Report of which many of the states in Central Africa sub-region performs very poor in these ranking. For instance, Burundi has the lowest per capita GDP in the world of $90 [2005] and half of its population is under 14 years-indicating likely waves of violence when they reach maturity only to embrace poverty and destitution.

Eight of ECCAS' member states are categorised as "not free" in the Freedom in the World Index, and the remaining two – the CAR and Equatorial Guinea – are in the category comprising the ten states in the world with the lowest score on political rights and civil liberties (Ingerstad & Lindell, 2015:3).

In cases where state weakness is accompanied by intense violence and warring factions, acting against government, states may be characterized as failed or collapsed. Thereby, "the enduring character" and "the consuming quality" of the occurring violence are important rather than "the absolute intensity." (Rotberg,2004:16) Among further indicators of state failure, "criminal violence" can play a role. A core part of Rotberg"s argumentation consists of the notion that failed states are "not longer able or willing" to fulfil their responsibilities (the case of CAR, DRC, Burundi). Both conditions are very different, but can equally be the reason why a state loses its legitimacy. (Rotberg,2004:17) This weakness in state is one of the major cause of insecurity as other group takes advantage of the weakness or failure of the state to come to power through coup or any unconstitutional means.

4.2 Colonial legacy and shadow-statehood as a cause of Insecurity in ECCAS

The concept of shadow-statehood is referred to a definition elaborated by William Reno in his book *Warlord Politics and African States* (1999). While the concepts of state failure emphasize the institutional frameworks, this

approach rather points to the extra-institutional field. Reno employs the term shadow state to describe a political environment characterized by the existence of a sphere located parallel to the official and institution-based state. This shadow state is "a very real, but not formally recognized, patronage system that was rigidly organized and centered on rulers‟ control over resources." (Reno,1999:2). In a shadow state, private networks challenge formal institutions. Still, as Akude argues, "external recognition is the basis of authority" forasmuch as "shadow states have judicial, but seriously lack empirical sovereignty and even legitimacy." ʏet that recognition implies no further need to develop domestic legitimacy, as a regime "gathering critical resources either from superpower patrons or from investors willing to invest" is no longer dependent on taxation of domestic productive sectors. Most of the states in ECCAS zone are controlled by former-colonial master such as France and other EU member state. And because of this control, state no longer operates to suit the interest of the citizens but the interest of those external bodies (Akude,2009:71)

In the majority of Sub-Saharan states primary resources and foreign aid represent a basic means of power allocation. Therefore, ruling elites are tempted to shift the level of control away from bureaucracy to the informal area. Within this area there is neither transparency nor accountability: The ruling regime can be seen as a pivotal point of politics whereas institutions supposed to offer general access to areas of public interest are deprived of their abilities and responsibilities.

This amounts to a sort of capture of the state allowing a pursuit "of power through purely personal means. This pursuit becomes synonymous with and indistinguishable from their private interests.". Such interests do not stop at the private allocation of wealth. It is rather a distinctive form of rule in weak

states. Hence, systems of "patronage" (Reno,1999:2) politics have replaced bureaucratic arrangements, which have turned out to be very weak. In such systems, rulers face a necessity to respond to interests of one or several clients in order to benefit from their support. Consequently, "private authority" of ruling elites overrides ideas of "collective authority." (Reno,1999:2) This leads to the observation that the provision of goods in weak states is not declining equally but as Reno points out, "inhabitants do not enjoy security by right of membership in a state"(Reno,1999:3) rather by membership of certain groups within the state. Other groups therefore tend to form similar set-ups, allowing extra-governmental leaders to pursue their motives by employing discourses of grievance. Foreign aid meant to generally enhance development or relieve suffering is likely to be captured by the shadow state.

4.3 The politics of the "Belly"

The term politics of the Belly is a French word used by Jean-François Bayart "La politique du ventre". Bayart (1999) definition of this concept refers to the state being a "milk-cow" for the tenants of political power (Bayart,1999:8) It is linked to phenomena of corruption and nepotism (Akunde,2009:68). The chronic weakness of the post-colonial state in Central Africa joined by a systematic lack of productive industries has perverted the state into a compensatory kind of enterprise. During the Cold War, that caused a considerable number of so-called proxy-wars, African leaders were basically not sanctioned but supported from outside, regardless if they practised corrupt politics or not. With the end of global bipolarity and "in the name of good governance and the workings of market" (Bayart et al,1999:8) the political climate changed and the international community now condemns corruption

publicly, though that is often mere lip service. Globalization on the other hand has widely facilitated illegal economic activities.

Bayart et al (1999) argue, “the relationship between economic accumulation and the tenure of power in Africa now exists in new conditions.” As mentioned above, distinct features of African political economies and the influence of Western ideas of the state allowed the emergence of so-called kleptocracies in Africa (Akunde,2009:68). The reasons for that are widespread: On the one hand, the idea of the nation-state and western market economy does not merge with precolonial modes of governance. The colonial state resembles a cap drawn over the African continent. But instead of installing a copy of the traditional Westphalian state, colonies used to function like enterprises extracting as much goods as possible. This explains why postcolonial African regimes regard the state as a form of enterprise. The vicious circle we face nowadays has simply been established by the first regime in any state beginning to use the state for personal enrichment and the following incumbents performing similarly in order to compensate the generated mismatch. Akude implies this circle, noting that On the other hand, benefits of globalisation and neo-liberal ideology eased transnational cooperation between states and private companies as well as between non-state actors and private companies. Such trade connections already had a long tradition not least because African leaders were tempted to “enjoy a higher level of living comparative to the rest of their societies” (Akunde,2009:69). Recurring to Bayart, this has been recognized as “strategies of extraversion” (Akunde,2009:69) in scientific literature, as a pre-colonial phenomenon sustained in modified forms during colonial and post-colonial times (Akunde,2009:70). Both explanations strengthen the underlying hypothesis of

"the state, being a product of this trajectory of extraversion" and "an instrument of this strategy. (Akunde,2009:70) "The combination of positions of public office with positions of accumulation (Bayart,1999:8) is still a pattern in the respective polities and the process of internationalisation and transnationalisation offers "new opportunities for illegal activities" which as observable in the context of DRC, CAR become virulent in the context of foreign, especially humanitarian aid.

4.4 Other Causes of insecurity in the Central Africa Sub-region

4.4.1 Spill over effect from Rwanda Genocide (refugee crisis)

The issue of refugees is a historical problem that has greatly undermined regional stability. Failure to repatriate the 1959 Rwandan refugees has been the central problem of conflict that triggered the Rwandan civil war in 1990. Issues of refugees as a cause of conflict cannot be examined in isolation of political power control and economic greed. This is the major factor underpinning forced displacement. Ms. Sadako Ogata, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in her evaluation of UNHCR preparedness and response, traces the origin of conflict in the DRC Congo and Burundi from persistent influx and unwillingness to settle the refugee problem. She acknowledges that the ethnic tension and conflict in the Great Lake Region of central Africa have been the cause of repeated instances of human displacement (Ogata 2000:245). The pattern of events in the last 50 years is rooted in a long history of violence, but it is also a history of missed opportunities such as the right to nationality. Paul Collier in his article, the *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and TheirImplications for Policy*, presents a high risk of conflict in countries where incomes are low. He argues that when people are poor they have little to lose from joining a rebel group, so

that rebel organizations find recruitment cheap (Collier,2006:10). At least, there should be no doubt about the link between refugees, missed opportunities and armed rebellion. Ogata contends that failure to pursue just solutions to old grievances has in all too many cases, years or decades later, led to a recurrence of violence and to bloodletting on an even greater scale than before. To her, the legacy of the crisis in Rwanda was the presence of Tutsi refugees in all neighbouring countries and the denied right to return home (Ogata 2000, 245). Currently, armed groups such as the FDLR, use refugees residing in the DRC as an easy source of recruiting.

4.4.2 Dictatorship, coup d'etat and unconstitutional means to power

Coup d'Etat and unconstitutional rise to power has been the order of the day in the Central Africa sub-region. For instance, CAR has witness just one elected government since gaining independence. Since André Kolingba's forces took power in 1981, CAR presidents have remained in power for an average of ten years. Kolingba, who overthrew David Dacko in 1981, was president for twelve years before losing to Ange-Félix Patassé in the 1993 presidential election. Patassé led the country until 15 March 2003, when he was overthrown by his former chief of staff, François Bozizé. The cycle has been repeated. Like his predecessor, François Bozizé was president for ten years before being overthrown by Michael Djotodia, head of Seleka militias. Also, an analysis of the political context in Central Africa shows that lack of good governance, lack of rule of law and poverty are real and those factors are the main elements that constitute insecurity and instability in the subregion. Corruption is considered a curse, countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and the DRC are amongst the most corrupt countries in the world. (Transparency international report, 2008) Moreover, the

personalisation and longevity in power in Central Africa remain a serious problem. Paul Biya of Cameroon, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Republic of Congo, Does Santos of Angola, Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Idriss Deby of Chad have all been in power for more than 20years. Omar Bongo of Gabon who died in power has been for more than 20 years also. In some of the ECCAS state, the various dictators in cases of protest, uses excessive military force over the civilian population, this was the case of Cameroon in 2008. Some of these leaders had more often manipulated the constitution to enable them stay in power.

In an interview with Professor Lambi, he surmises that, they can never be peace where there is injustice, when the people protest, they are crushed by the military and the only way is to allow the leader until his term of office come to an end, when this happened, he manipulates the constitution to allow him stay in power like was the case of Cameroon. The popular saying is "only death will take him from that seat" and even when such leader dies in power, the children or immediate relative takes over power as was the case in Gabon and hence the issue of Governance and democracy in ECCAS' region is also one of the major cause of insecurity since it is characterized by lack of good governance, non-respect for rule of law and severe violation of human rights.

In addition, poverty has become a fatality in this part of the African continent. Populations have become vulnerable, criminal and terrorist because of poverty. Others express their view in an interview by saying that, some dictators even have good policies which helps the nation citing the case of Muamat Gaddafi, but in Central Africa sub-region, the rate of poverty is unbearable and some even believe that it is the policy of the state to keep the

population in perpetual poverty so as to buy their conscience in times of need such as elections.

4.4.3 The presence of Arms/rebels group in the Region

The Central Africa Sub-region has been a safe haven for many rebel group such as Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), Southern Peoples‟ Liberation Army (SPLA), Mayi-Mayi militias, the Séléka militias, the Anti-Balaka. This numerous arm groups post a serious threat to peace in the ECCAS' region. These militias and arm groups involves in illegal activities in the region such as poaching wildlife, recruitment of child soldier, human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom as well as cases of persuasive rape (Africa Capacity Building Foundation,2008) The use of Small and Light weapons by these militias make weapons easily available to the youthful population in the entire sub-region thereby causing security threat. Some of these militias are even hired by power mongers to oust legitimate government in power such as the Anti Balaka and Séléka militias in The CAR.

4.4.4 Transnational criminality

Due to the weak institutional capacities of many ECCAS states, vast areas in the region are characterised by a general lawlessness. This gives room for illegal armed groups to exploit the region's immense and extremely valuable natural resources, thus creating incentives to prolong instability and conflict, and to form alliances between armed groups and corrupt state representatives in order to secure profit.
Central Africa is ravaged by, for example, the trafficking of minerals, narcotics, timber and wildlife as well as trafficking of children into armed

conflict. A huge amount of small arms and light weapons are circulated in the region, used not only for rebellions but also for armed robberies, illegal road blocks and poaching. In for example eastern DRC and the CAR, all these phenomena blend, making it difficult to determine whether groups' motivations are foremost ideological, territorial or economic.(Ingerstad & Lindell, 2015:25)

The transnational flows of contraband undermine state building and perpetuate insecurity in Central Africa. So far ECCAS' focus has been predominantly military but the organisation has identified the need to develop tools for intelligence gathering and sharing, and to facilitate both strategic and technical collaboration between bordering states. One obstacle is the lack of properly demarked

borders, which is addressed in the ECCAS border programme established in 2008 to limit criminal activities. ECCAS has five training centres of which one is focused on police training. However, it can be questioned whether the political will exists to regulate the movements of people and goods efficiently. Furthermore, the ECCAS member states have signed the Kinshasa Convention, regulating small arms and light weapons and countering their illicit trade, but many states lack the capacity or will to enforce the convention. Established in 2010, the convention has not yet entered into force because only five states have ratified it.

4.4.5 Lack of democracy and Good governance as cause of insecurity

Many of the continent's longest-serving heads of state are in this region. The presidents of Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo have been in power for more than 30 years; Chad's president, Idriss Déby, for a quarter-century. Democratic institutions are important

mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution and therefore important if states are to be able to handle societal challenges. Eight of ECCAS' member states are categorised as "not free" in the Freedom in the World Index, and the remaining two – the CAR and Equatorial Guinea – are in the category comprising the ten states in the world with the lowest score on political rights and civil liberties (Ingerstad & Lindell, 2015:31).The combination of limited possibilities to voice grievances, poor governance, uneven resource distribution and weak security sectors means that ECCAS' member states risk facing increased social unrest and instability due to popular discontent. A particular issue relates to the lack of free and fair elections, and within the ECCAS General Secretariat there is concern about violence in relation to the general elections that will be held in a majority of the ECCAS member states in 2016–2018.

The institutional weakness of ECCAS member states also translates into limited capacity within ECCAS institutions. Furthermore, as an intergovernmental organisation, ECCAS has not been given the mandate to engage in domestic conflicts in member states. Its silence in relation to social unrest this year in Gabon and Burundi illustrates this. Instead, Cameroon sent the Rapid intervention Batalion unit known as BIR to crack down on the social unrest in Gabon against Ali Bongo. (Ingerstad & LIndell, 2015:61)

4.5 Manifestation of insecurity in the ECCAS' region

4.5.1The CAR case

In the Central Africa Republic, the roots of the current insecurity in large parts of the country, especially in the North East and North West, can to an extent be traced to the severe political and socioeconomic crisis at the end of the

1990s, when general discontent over growing poverty and the non-payment of salary arrears to civil servants and soldiers culminated in civil unrest and army mutinies. The porosity of national borders, the uncontrolled movement of combatants and armed groups across borders and between different zones of conflict and the proliferation of illegal arms and weapons increase the risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring states and these all greatly contributed to the instability in CAR. For Debos, this risk is magnified in the case of Chad, Sudan, Uganda and the CAR in particular by the willingness of combatants to readily shift allegiances between conflict parties and rebel movements (Debos, 2008:32).

The presence of armed groups such as the Seleka militias as well as Anti-Balaka militias are also a direct source of insecurity among the population. In the border provinces of the CAR, the high level of violence by gangs that attack local people and villages, burn down houses, kidnap children for ransom, poach wildlife and rustle cattle has led to the displacement of almost 200,000 Central Africans within the country and a further 150,000 to neighbouring countries, especially Chad (UNHCR, 2010). An overarching security challenge lies in the internal political instability of Central African states. Weak political legitimacy leading to fragile social cohesion threatens the stability of political structures and challenges the capabilities of state institutions, the numerous coups in the CAR is a glaring example.

4.5.2 The Boko Haram Case (Cameroon and Chad)

Over the past two years the armed conflict in north-eastern Nigeria, where the armed group Boko Haram has been waging a war against the Nigerian state since 2009, has spilled over into the neighbouring countries. Chad and Cameroon, the two ECCAS member states affected by the armed conflict, are

contributing troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) created by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), now operating under an AU mandate. ECCAS Heads of State have declared their support for the MNJTF and ECCAS cooperates with its West African counterpart ECOWAS. However, member states' military engagement takes place outside the ECCAS framework and the role of the organisation will be limited as long as the affected member states choose other forums for cooperation. The Boko Haram conflict which is seen as spilled over effect from Nigeria has also been seen as a sign of insecurity in the regions which has caused many deaths and destruction of property especially in Northern part of Cameroon as well as Chad.

4.5.3 The DRC case

The existence of armed rebels in the DRC, ethnicity and the refuges problems, illegal exploitation of resources and support to armed rebels have been the current regional conflict issues. The DRC has become a home of armed rebels originating from Rwanda and Uganda. Recently, the FDLR rebels from Rwanda, the ADF and the LRA from Uganda are the central reason for the conflict between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. Credible documentation supports the role of the DRC in instigating proxy wars against Rwanda. According to Colin Thomas-Jensen, Noel Atama, and Olivia Caeymaex in their assessment of Operation Kimia II, DRC collaboration with FDLR armed rebels increased tension between the DRC and Rwanda (Jensen et al,2009). Like Atama, Khardiagala argues that recently the battle lines in the DRC are primarily between remnants of Rwanda's Hutu militias, implicated in the 1994 genocide, who have constituted themselves as the FDLR (Khardiagala 2008, 5). Filip Reyntjens, in his book *The Great African War*, claims the sources of

instability in the GLR were, in essence, domestic reflecting as they did the political conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Kivu region in the DRC more generally. Their repercussions were increasingly felt throughout the larger region (Reyntjens 2009, 43). Apart from the FDRL of Rwanda, there are similar rebels of Ugandan origin operating in the DRC. They include the LRA a rebel group commanded by Joseph Kony, and the Allied Democratic Forces and the Peoples Redemption Army both operating in the forests of the DRC. According to Khardiagala, the bulk of LRA forces are still scattered in the DRC where they continue to represent a source of insecurity for civilians (Khardiagala 2008). Human Rights Watch argues that since its campaign in 2008, the LRA alone has killed an estimated 2,400 and abducted 3,400 civilians (Human Rights Watch 2011). Yet, Human Rights Watch notes that the mistrust between the Congolese and Ugandan military has hampered coordination and cooperation between them against these rebel groups (Human Rights Watch 2011). For instance, Human Rights Watch has underscored that, on January 16, 2011, Congolese authorities denied the Ugandan army permission to send an intercepting force to Banda, along the DRC border with Uganda, in order to go after the LRA leader (Human Rights Watch 2011). The reason for the denial was to prevent Uganda's exploitation of the DRC as it did in 1998-2003 (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Rich mineral deposits in the DRC have become a contested ground for both state and non-state actors in the GLR of Central Africa. The DRC had accused Rwanda and Uganda of illegal exploitation of its natural resources. According to Global Witness, a majority of DRC government officials have benefited from the presence and FDLR control of rich mineral deposits. A government official in the DRC has estimated that at least 90 percent of gold exports were

undeclared, as such provincial government officials struggle to control mineral exports (Global Witness Report 2009:16). The FARDC works in collaboration with the FDLR and through mutual agreement sometimes share the spoils from mining deposits (Global Witness Report 2009:18). Conflict of interests over mineral control at all levels created a fertile ground to maintain chaos by allowing safe haven to the FDLR as they collaborate in safeguarding interests over mineral deposits. According to Karen Ballantine and Heiko Nitzschke in their article, *Beyond Greed and Grievance*, access to natural resources is the major cause of conflict in the region. To them, the so called "resource wars" in the DRC have significantly shaped current ideas and policy perspectives on the role that economic factors, particularly rebel exploitation of natural resources, play in a contemporary armed conflict (Ballantine 2004). Ballantine argues that there is a close correlation between armed conflicts that afflict this region and natural resource exploitation. To her, the economic agendas are consequential to the character and duration of armed conflict resolution, with predatory economic behaviour becoming critical to sustaining, prolonging, and transforming conflict (Ballantine 2004). Global Witness presents evidence to support this argument. It underscores that the FARDC is involved in mineral exploitation in collaboration with the military hierarchy including senior officers in the provincial command to augment their meager salaries (Global Witness Report 2009). It is noted that the extent of military mineral exploitation without impunity illustrates the deeper problem which characterizes the Congolese army and the country's governing institutions as a whole (Global Witness Report 2009). In Lusaka, Zambia in 2010, a special summit for the regional Heads of States signed a declaration setting up a regional mineral certification mechanism with a possibility of imposing sanctions on the defaulters (ICGLR 2010b).

4.5.4 The Burundi case

Just like the DRC, Burundi is a country of the Central African subregion. It is a landlocked country located in the region of the Great Lakes. Its population is composed of the Hutu majority and the Tutsi and Twa minorities.140 This poor and dense populated country 'has experienced cycles of war since independence was attained on 1 July 1962'. (Boshoff et al,2010:32). The conflicts in Burundi have been particularly based on ethnicity similar to the case in Rwanda. Hence, the first major conflict in Burundi took place in 1972 when the Hutu rebels group from the south used Tanzania to invade the country. The conflict caused the death of hundreds of people. The second major conflict was in October 1993. It was caused by the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye followed by the killing of his successor Cyprien Ntaryamira and the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana in a plane crash in April 1994. These two conflicts have plunged Burundi into violent conflict and insecurity for decades. To tackle this 'bitter civil war in Burundi' which has caused the killing of thousands of people, the international community deployed a peacekeeping mission in the country. In this respect, South Africa played an important role in the restoration of peace in Burundi. After the death of Julius Nyerere, the former president of Tanzania in 1999 who was deeply involved with the negotiations between the different rebel groups, Nelson Mandela the former president of South Africa was appointed as facilitator of the peace process in Burundi in December 1999. In December 2001, for the first time in its history, South Africa sent a peacekeeping mission to Burundi in order to protect returning political leaders. This intervention by South Africa 'marked the country's engagement in peace operations in Burundi, and was a significant part of Mandela's strategic input into the Arusha agreement'. In April 2003,

AU sent a peacekeeping mission in Burundi (AMIB). This mission was also the first experience of the AU, it was comprised of 3335 troops from South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia with additional observers from Gabon, Burkina Faso, Togo and Tunisia. Less than two years later, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1545 on 21 May 2004 authorising the deployment of a UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in order to transform the existing AMIB into a UN peacekeeping mission. The conflict in Burundi show the manifestation of insecurity in the ECCAS' region.

4.5.5 Manifestation of insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea

The Gulf of Guinea is part of the Atlantic Ocean between Cape Lopez in Gabon, north and west to Cape Palmas in Liberia. It encompasses West and Central African countries such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Liberia, Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe. This part of the Continent has incredible natural resources 'which, if carefully managed, can contribute to global prosperity'.(D O Mañe, 2005:9)

Figure 4.1: Map showing Gulf of GUINEA

Source: Adapted from Baldauf, 2010

The Gulf of Guinea is an area 'where recoverable oil reserves are reported in excess of five billion barrel of crude oil and oil production exceeds one million barrels per day'. Besides, the region has other large reserves of mineral resources such as diamonds and gold and surrounding countries including Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Chad are 'oil producers and are expected to become major suppliers of energy.

Hence, it appears that six member states of ECCAS (Gabon, Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe)

are directly linked to the Gulf of Guinea. However, that region has become an opportune territory for pirates and, according to some observers, the Gulf of Guinea 'is second only to Somalia in terms of such attacks, with some 32 pirate strikes reported in the first nine months of 2009'. (Baldauf,2010:22) Hence, with its strategic position, it is now said that 'the waters of the Gulf of Guinea are at least as dangerous as those off the Somali coast, if not more so'. As a result, all the countries of the region and especially those of the Central Africa subregion are victims of acts of piracy which endanger the security of the region. In this respect, it is important to mention the different recent attacks that have taken place in this area: in 2007, there was an attack on a supermarket in Port-Gentil (Republic of Gabon), in 2008 another attack was reported in a Bank in Bata (Equatorial Guinea) and during the same year, two other attacks took place in three banks in Cameroon in the town of Limbe and most recent in Douala. (Baldauf, 2010:42)

4.6 Measures adopted by ECCAS to address security threat

4.6.1 Force Multinationale en Centrafrique, FOMUC (CEMAC mission)

CEMAC has been more strongly adhering to its economic objectives than ECCAS. Nevertheless, in 2002, the conflict in the CAR forced the organisation

to go beyond its treaty and broaden its agenda towards peace and security. In fact, since the reform process of ECCAS had not been finalised in 2002, CEMAC was forced to, as the first Central African organisation, deploy a joint multinational force to CAR to intervene in support of peace and security.(Meyer, 2008:7)

Already in 1997, the states of Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea set up a joint peace mission under Gabonese command

in the CAR. Operating under a UN chapter VII mandate, the mission supervised the MICOPAX (ECCAS mission) implementation of a peace agreement between the government, army mutineers and political opposition. This mission also monitored the disarmament process (Meyer, 2009:160). The mission was funded by France and when France, in line with the "neither interference nor indifference" policy of the new socialist government, cut the funding in 1998, the mission was phased out. The UN mission MINURCA subsequently replaced the Central African force.

In 2000, the situation in the CAR was considered stable enough for MINURCA to withdraw. Nevertheless, over the next two years CAR's own security forces faced difficulties in stabilising the state. The instability in CAR was considered by the CEMAC states as a threat to the stability in the entire region. At the CEMAC summit in October 2002, it was therefore decided that the CEMAC member states would send a multinational peace force to CAR to assist the security forces and prevent an overthrow of the CAR government (Meyer,2009:159). ECCAS should have been the regional organisation to establish such a force, however, since ECCAS newly created security facilities – COPAX and the CDS – were not yet operational it was decided that the *Force Multinationale en Centrafrique* (FOMUC) would operate as a CEMAC mission, until the ECCAS structures were functional.

FOMUC, which consisted of 380 troops from Gabon, the Republic of Congo and Chad deployed to Bangui, the capital of CAR, in December 2002. The mission's initial mandate was to secure and protect the city and the airport and safeguard president Patassé from any coups. Nevertheless, this mandate was redefined several times and FOMUC became largely involved in monitoring the transition and reconciliation process as well as preparing for the elections that were to be held in May 2005. FOMUC was also engaged in providing

support to the disarmament of rebel forces and in arresting the leaders of such groupings; this mandate led to expand FOMUC's presence beyond Bangui (Meyer,2009:161).

FOMUC was only ever marginally funded by the CEMAC states. Instead, as with the preceding mission, France sustained FOMUC financially and logistically during the first two years of its existence. In 2004, the EU African Peace Facility program (APF) came into existence. The APF aims to, among other things, provide predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations. (Meyer, 2009:166). Through this scheme, the EU provided funding to FOMUC throughout the rest of its existence. Military and logistical support continued to be provided by France along with Germany and China which provided additional support to the mission. When FOMUC was replaced by MICOPAX in July 2008, similar funding mechanisms remained.

4.6.2 Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX)

In October 2007 it was decided at a Heads of State and Government summit of ECCAS that its peace and security structures were mature enough to bear the primary responsibility for peace and security related matters in the region. Nine months later, FOMUC was replaced by an ECCAS peace consolidation force – *Mission de consolidation de la paix en République Centrafrique*, MICOPAX.

MICOPAX, which is deployed in the centre, north-west and north-east of the CAR, takes place under the authority of ECCAS and is the first military operation undertaken under the auspice of COPAX. The mission is monitored and evaluated by the CDS.(International researcher 2 in Elowson & Wiklund,2011:43)

The revising and broadening of the mandate that had started under FOMUC, has continued under MICOPAX. The overall mission objective is now to contribute to durable peace and security in the CAR by creating preconditions for sustainable development in the country. To do so, MICOPAX has a mandate

from ECCAS to:

- Protect civilians
- Secure the territory
- Contribute to the national reconciliation process

To facilitate the political dialogue initiated by President Bozize. Troop contributing states have expanded to include not only Gabon, the Republic of Congo and Chad, but also Cameroon and the DRC. In addition, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo provide a police contingent. Several member states contribute observers to the mission. Civilian personnel, including a policy unit, also accompany the forces. The civilian component consists of the Special Representative, the Chief of Staff, a Political Advisor and an SSR advisor.

MICOPAX is deployed in Bangui and in the north of the country, including in Ouham-Pendé (Paoua and Bozoum), Nana-Gribizi (Kaga-Bandoro) and Ndélé (Bamingui Bangoran prefecture). This mission is supported by a detachment of 241 French soldiers from *Operation Boali* and funded by the European Union which contributes two thirds of funding through the African Peace Facility (APF) established in 2004.

Table 4.1 ECCAS member contribution to MICOPAX, April 2010

Contributor	Mil.	Obs.	Police	Other	Total
Angola	-	-	-	2	2
Burundi	3	5	-	2	10
Cameroon	141	5	21	3	170
Rep. Congo	16	6	125	3	150
DRC	107	-	-	2	109
Gabon	137	5	-	5	147
Equatorial Guinea	2	5	-	1	8
Saõ Tomé et Principe	-	-	-	2	2
Chad	121	5	-	1	127
Total	527	31	146	21	725

Source: Adapted from Elowson & Wiklund, 2011

Since September 2007, the Central African forces have deployed alongside the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). MINURCAT, a unique UN mission aimed solely at the protection of civilians, completed its mandate in December 2010, upon request from the Chadian government. France was the main driving force behind the deployment of MINURCAT. Despite a similar mandate, coordination between MICOPAX and MINURCAT never amounted to more than limited information exchange. Similarly, in spite of the regional links between the conflicts in CAR and the DRC, MICOPAX has not had any significant information exchange with the neighbouring UN Mission in the DRC MONUSCO. (Meyer, 2009:169)

As stated previously, the MICOPAX budget has to a large extent been covered by donors. The EU Commission, through the African Peace Facility, provides

the main bulk of funding. In 2009, the EU reportedly provided €14.6 million for payment of troop allowances and general maintenance. France, also a major donor, allocated approximately € 9,5 million while the contributions by ECCAS member states amounted to about € 6 million. This implies that around 50% of the funds are provided by the EU, around 30% by France and 25% by the ECCAS member states (ECCAS International partner 1& 3 in Elowson & Wiklund, 2011:44)

In the framework of the Africa-EU partnership, a joint EU/AU/ECCAS evaluation mission was conducted in June 2009 to assess the impact of the force. On this basis, it has been agreed to continue the support by the African Peace Facility to MICOPAX.

4.6.3 The Gulf of Guinea maritime security coordination

Seven member states in ECCAS have coasts on the Gulf of Guinea, an area where piracy has steadily risen over the last decade. The attacks against and looting of shipping, oil stealing, illegal fishing and smuggling threaten both security

and economic development in the states concerned, and have therefore created a genuine political will to increase the surveillance of the resources at sea.To tackle this problem of instability in the Gulf of Guinea, ECCAS took important measures. On 24 October 2009, the member states adopted the Protocol on the strategy to secure ECCAS States' vital interests at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. The most visible results so far have been attained in the maritime zone controlled by Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, with a decrease in attacks since 2009. ECCAS was the first concerned organisation to adopt a strategy for maritime security in 2009, a commitment that was reinforced at the Yaoundé summit in 2013 when ECCAS decided to develop a

joint strategy to combat piracy. the Protocol establishes the Regional Maritime Security Centre of Central Africa (CRESMAC), Multinational Centre of Coordination (CMC) and an Operational Centre of Marine (COM) which are the main organs in charge of the implementation of the missions provided by the Protocol. The CRESMAC is based in Pointe Noire (Republic of Congo) and its main objective is to control the maritime space of ECCAS member states of the Gulf of Guinea through the protection of natural resources, the securing of maritime roads, the fight against illegal immigration, drug trafficking, piracy and maritime pollution among others. To achieve that mission, the Protocol divides the maritime zone of ECCAS into three zones (A, B, D)(See article 7(2) of the ECCAS Protocol on maritime security)Zone A is composed of Angola and DRC, zone B includes Angola, Gabon and Republic of Congo and finally zone D encompasses Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe. All these zones have one CMC which is under the command of CRESMAC. It is important to note that the activities of CRESMAC are carried out under the command of COPAX which is the political and military organ of ECCAS. In this respect, operations in Zone D (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe) have already begun under the name of SECMAR1. Hence, on 6 May 2009 in Yaoundé a technical agreement was signed by the ministers of Defence of the member states of zone D in order to start controlling its waters, protect vital interests of the different countries with the aim to facilitate free circulation of persons and goods in this zone. The operations consisted of the launching of joint mixed patrols in zone D. On 16 September 2009, the first launching of these joint mixed patrols took place in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) and three Patrols (Patrol boat Cabo San Juan of Equatorial Guinea, Patrol boat Akwayafe of Cameroon and Patrol Betseng of Gabon) were involved.(Mbah, 2011:14) In

this field, the interests of the ECCAS community correspond to the interests of actively engaged external partners such as the US, the UK, France and Germany and this appears to have been key to the development of collective responses. One example is the development of maritime coordination centres on four levels: an inter-regional coordination centre in Cameroon to link ECCAS and ECOWAS, the regional coordination centre CRESMAC in the Republic of the Congo, one multinational coordination centre per maritime zone established in Cameroon and Angola respectively, and national maritime centres. The ability of these coordination centres is however hampered by the lack of institutional and financial capacity, trained staff and technical equipment – both nationally and within ECCAS – as well as by the complexity of cross-border collaboration in practice.

4.7 Challenges facing ECCAS

4.7.1 The problem of Regional Identity

Central Africa is a very heterogeneous region, especially in terms of geography, socio-economic development, history, language and culture. it gathers as diverse countries as Chad in the Sahel, Burundi and the DRC in the Great Lakes region and Angola in Southern Africa. The DRC, the CAR and Chad are among the continent's least developed countries, whereas Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have the highest GDPs/capita in Africa.While French prevails as the main working language in the Secretariat, ECCAS' membership includes Anglophone, Francophone, Arabophone, Lusophone and Hispanophone countries. This heterogeneity among member states hampers integration, as well as the ability to reach an agreement on regional security issues and promote peace and security cooperation. it instead fosters disunity

and fragmentation among member states as well as the formation of blocs. States put their interest first instead of the region's interest. (Meyer,2011:81)

Chad is very much concerned about the developments in his neighbour country, and hence has deeply been involved in the country's politics. Stability and security, and a situation in compliance with his specific interests are indeed essential for Déby to mainly realize his economic and political ambitions. With the start of oil extraction in 2003 in the southern area of Chad, Déby's attention has been mainly focused on the border with the CAR and the Republic's frontier provinces, which however present the most instable ones. Bozizé's incapacity to have control over these peripheral areas and especially to contain those centrifugal movements that are hostile to Déby's regime played a fundamental role in Chad dropping his former ally (ICG 2013). A second faux-pas of Bozizé that has both challenged and triggered Déby's regional engagement was the intensification of his relations to the RSA. Although Pretoria's reasons for assisting the CAR regime in his fight against the Séléka rebels have never clearly been laid down, it can be assumed that they were both of economic (mining concessions) and political (expanding power to Central Africa) nature. Especially, the presence of 400 South African troops on the CAR territory must apparently have been considered by Déby as a severe provocation and clear affront against him. It certainly significantly influenced ECCAS' changing attitude from first assisting the Bozizé regime in December to remain in power to acknowledging his opponents as new political leader in March. Besides the Chadian interests underlying the regional crisis resolution approach, it can be assumed that the fall of Bozizé and the way the situation was handled were also complying with particular concerns of other states in the region. A first issue are the aforementioned close ties that Bozizé had made with South Africa's President

Jacob Zuma. South Africa certainly presents an important economic partner for almost all ECCAS states. However, the partnership between Bangui and Pretoria were highly disapproved given the fear of raising South African influence throughout the region. In addition, several bilateral animosities have emerged between Bozizé and some of his counterparts in the region: Gabon took it badly that the CAR regime supported Nkosazana Ndlamini-Zuma from RSA against the Gabonese candidate Jean Ping in the race for the AU Commission chair. In a quite similar way, tensions arose between Cameroun and the CAR over the re-election of the CEMAC Commission President, a Cameroonian, against the rotation principle which would have been in favour of Bangui (ICG, 2013). Being so influenced and driven by particular interests and vulnerable to frictions over them, Central Africa's regional cooperation is considerably weak and fragile. Any progress towards some kind of supranationalism and integration driven by its institutions is challenged by the complex interplay of particular motives and ambitions. Regional decision making, especially as regards peace and security questions, as well as the implementation of policies and agreements are mainly subject to specific primarily short-term concerns and commitments, and often more based on the predominant position of one state or a superficial compromise than on any shared consolidated vision. In this perspective, what the process is lacking is some form of self-dynamic that could make it less dependent on the political will of the member states and give it more independence and continuity. As long as Central Africa's regional institutional framework, and especially the Peace and Security Architecture reflect the currently applied intergovernmental logic, their potential to contribute to any long-term sustainable form of regional stability however remains more than questionable.

4.7.2 Problem of multiple or overlapping membership

Sango and Forje (2011:1-2) cited in Banlilon & Etta-Nyoh (2014) identify 'overlapping' as a major problem of African regionalism. To them, the nature of overlapping membership in African regional integration shows just how complicated Africa's struggle for unity is. Ultimately, this may result in certain states paying more attention to regional groupings than to the continental agenda.

Another challenge affecting ECCAS is the problem of overlapping memberships with other RECs and regional organisations. ECCAS is formed by states that are also members of CEMAC, SADC, the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC/CBLT) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEn-SAd). Economic community of the Great Lake countries (ECGLC)

Figure 4.2: Overlapping membership in Central Africa



Source: Adapted from Meyer, 2015

Multiple memberships may be an advantage when it comes to addressing the trans-border and trans-regional dimension of insecurity. in Central Africa, this potential is however largely neglected. The membership of some states in other communities is resulting in inner fragmentation. The CEMAC states have in some instances formed a bloc against the rest, and Rwanda left ECCAS in 2007 as its economic interests were more oriented towards East Africa and its community EAC. Consequently, cooperation and exchange with other RECs remain limited to a few cases. Some states have shown loyalty to other regional integration bloc than others, that also account for the reason why payment of membership due is neglected by some states, it is difficult for a state to pay annual dues in several regional blocs, and hence states choose to pay in the bloc that serves it interest most. Most members of ECCAS who are CEMAC member prefer to pay membership due to CEMAC first before

considering ECCAS which is the main Regional Economic Community (REC) in Central Africa recognized by AU.

4.7.3 The need for hegemon (Regional leader)

A major challenge in Central Africa is that, compared to other regions in Africa, there is no clear regional leader. Indeed, it is not evident which state could act as regional driver. The core state hegemonic theory holds that for integration to be successful, there must be a core state that is willing to take the burden to push integration further. Even the neo-functionalist hold this view also when they opined that states should begin integration modestly in areas of low politics, and a high authority should be set up as a sponsor of further integration (Rosamond, 2000:52) In the case of ECCAS, no state is willing to take the burden of integration or ready to act as sponsor for further integration. ECCAS lacks the Nigeria of ECOWAS, the South Africa of SADC, the Germany of EU, the EGYPT of AMU and consequently, the lack of a clear leader impedes integration in some areas. With regard to its size, economic potential and military power, Angola would be a valid candidate. However, Luanda remains torn between its memberships in SADC and ECCAS. in addition, the strong ties between France and the member states that also belong to CEMAC, as well as the still prevailing influence of the former colonial power within the region, present a challenge for Angola in increasing its role in ECCAS – and not only from a linguistic point of view. France will certainly oppose Angola's vision of being regional leader because of its dual membership in SADC and also for the fact that it is not a French speaking colony. For the promotion of regional peace and security, the presence of a regional lead nation is however often seen as 'an important

element of successful conflict management and peace-keeping' and a 'fulcrum of regional security co-operation'. (Ayangafac,2011:164)

In the most recent security crises in Central Africa, some countries certainly have tried to take the initiative in promoting multinational responses. The president of the Republic of the Congo, Denis Sassou-nguesso, has been serving as mediator in the conflict in the CAR, following in the footsteps of former Gabonese president Omar Bongo. Chad's head of state, Idriss Déby, currently aims to take the leadership role in the multinational military reaction to Boko Haram. However, in both cases, regional ambitions are more motivated by particular individual economic and/or strategic interests than by the desire to give impetus to the regional integration process. By involving himself so directly in the CAR crisis, Chad's President Déby has once again clearly demonstrated his ambitions to fill this gap and take the leading role in the region's political arena. The way the crisis in the CAR was handled on the regional level clearly has his fingerprints. Certainly, Chad currently holds the chairmanship of ECCAS, which might also explain why, for instance, the two extraordinary Conferences of Heads of State had been held in N'Djaména. However, the engagement of ECCAS, under Déby, has very much been guided by the Chadian vision and interests. This, consequently, is likely to conflict with other member states' competing interests instead of promoting more integration and stability within the region.

4.7.4 New Challenges facing the region (Tropical diseases and HIV/AIDS)

Banlilon & Etta-Nyoh (2014) asserts that African continent continues to suffer from HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria, and other infectious diseases which claim lives, diminishing the human resources and capacities of the population, hence,

economies of scale, production and this has impeded regional integration effort especially in the ECCAS' region. According to UNDP (7) the HIV/AIDS prevalence in Africa alone was 8.5%, as opposed to the global 1% in 2003. More so, about 2.5 million Africans were estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS in 2003 and 2.2 million died from it that same year. Similarly, in 2005, between 2.8 million and 3.9 million people in Africa became newly infected (Banlilon & Etta-Nyoh, 2014:16). The presence of these diseases has also created new challenges for member States of ECCAS to deal with, apart of growing insecurity in the sub-region, deplorable health care system as well as the outbreak of tropical diseases as well as HIV/AIDS has also become a potent challenge and has also impeded the success of the regional integration scheme.

4.8 Short comings of ECCAS in its peace and security architecture

4.8.1 ECCAS failure to response to conflict in DRC

The DRC is one of the largest country in Africa and the eleventh in the world and has around 71 million inhabitants. This country is also one of the richest countries in the world with respect to its natural resources. Yet, in the past decades, DRC faced a conflict which has claimed the lives of thousands of people and especially those who live in the eastern part of the country. According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC) between 1998 and 2004 some 3.8 million people died in the DRC. This period marked the second war in DRC. This second conflict was exacerbated by the involvement of seven armies of African countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The conflict had continued to cause the death of people despite the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in August 1999.

SADC has also played an important role in the DRC conflict. Its intervention in this country was an opportunity to provide its first peacekeeping and intervention force to assist the government of the late Laurent Desire Kabila. Indeed, DRC is also member of SADC, it is on that ground and especially on the basis of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation that SADC justified its military intervention in the country. Hence, the Southern African subregional institution contributed to the restoration of peace and security in the DRC and it still plays that role up to now. Contrary to the UN and SADC, the role of ECCAS in the conflict in the DRC is unclear yet the DRC is a founding member of ECCAS and deeply located in Central Africa. The Central African subregional institution did not take any real measures such as setting up a peacekeeping mission or deploying troops to contribute to the restoration of peace and security in the DRC. This silence on the part of ECCAS in the conflict in the DRC may be justified by the fact that at that moment, ECCAS was in the lethargy due to the different conflicts that occurred in seven of its member states and also by the fact that the Protocol relating to COPAX which is the basis of ECCAS' mandate in enforcing peace and security had not yet entered into force. However, that Protocol entered into force in January 2004, thus, ECCAS could have carried out some activities in order to consolidate peace and security in the DRC as provided for in the Protocol relating to COPAX, but it is not the case and this may be the reasons why ECCAS is not considered a viable security body.

4.8.2 ECCAS failure to address conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria concerning the Bakassi Peninsula

The Conflict in the Peninsula of Bakassi between Cameroon and Nigeria did not have any element of a civil war. It was a conflict based on the Bakassi Peninsula, an oil rich land, over which both countries claimed their

sovereignty. Bakassi Peninsula is 'an area of some 1000 km of mangrove swamp submerged islands mostly occupied by fishermen settlers'(Mbu,2004:150). It is the extension of the African territory of Calabar into the Atlantic Ocean and as said above, it is not only an oil wealthy place but it also has boats of heavy fish deposit. However, the discovery of these potentials 'has only helped heighten tensions between the two countries'(Mbu,2004:151) Hence, the real problem concerning the Bakassi peninsula was to determine which state had sovereignty over it. The tension between the two neighbours was visible and the military struggle became heated on 16 May 1981 when a Cameroon national radio news report informed 'the world that a Nigerian military patrol army violated Cameroun's territory by penetrating the Bakassi peninsula as far as the Rio del Rey and opening fire on the Cameroun Navy'. To respond to that situation Cameroon troops killed Nigerian soldiers. The instability in the region lasted and it caused the death of many people on both sides of the borders. In this light, although the Cameroonian government referred the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994, the killings of people did not stop in the region. The ICJ after seven years rendered its decision on 10 October 2002 in favour of Cameroon. (Mbu,2004:151)

An analysis of the Bakassi conflict shows that neither CEMAC nor ECCAS were involved in the conflict to support Cameroon, a member state of the two communities. More defective, Equatorial Guinea, a member state of both communities intervened on the side of Nigeria at the judicial level (Gankou & Ntah,2008:71).This reluctance of the ECCAS and CEMAC has been justified on grounds that at that moment, the two institutions' primary responsibility was to deal with economic integration and therefore there was no agenda related to conflict resolutions. Moreover, the Representative of ECCAS at the

AU claims that by bringing the case before the ICJ, ECCAS could not take a position anymore because the case was pending before the Court and according to him it could have been risky for the judicial process. These arguments contended by the Representative of ECCAS might be justifiable, nevertheless, it should be recalled that the rationale behind the creation or the establishment of a community is to build a real community which constitutes a block and therefore, when a member of the community has a problem or a dispute with any other state, all the community must engage in order to resolve the dispute. This idea is corroborated by the fact that on 24 February 2000 the members of ECCAS adopted the Protocol on Mutual Assistance, hence, the silence of the member states of ECCAS during the Bakassi conflict illustrated once again the lack of solidarity among ECCAS members.

4.8.3 The ongoing Boko Haram crisis

The Nigerian based islamist group Boko Haram has also engage in fighting in Cameroon particularly at the North as well as Chad. The two countries which are both members of CEMAC as well as ECCAS has been seriously fighting the Islamic sect, both countries are contributing troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) created by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), now operating under an AU mandate. ECCAS Heads of State have declared their support for the MNJTF verbally and no ECCAS state has contributed troops or other form of support to Cameroon and Chad. This silence may be due to conflict of interest amongst member state and question of who is at risk, since only two of the 10 member states are affected, neither ECCAS nor CEMAC has send in troops to help, surely because they feel that Cameroon and Chad has the military strength to contain Boko Haram and

moreover they don't see the possibility of spillover into a third ECCAS member state.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings

The study set out to investigate the causes of security challenges in the ECCAS' region, against this background, progress towards putting the regional peace and security architecture into operation is mainly driven on an ad hoc basis by single state or groups of states within the community. These efforts thus result from particular political, economic or strategic concerns rather than from a shared regional vision.

The study however opines that Poor governance, dictatorship, civil strife, poverty, mismanagement of natural resources as well as corruption which characterised the sub-region has been the main causes of insecurity in the ECCAS' sub-region. The numerous conflicts has posed as a risk factor to inhabitants of these regions and this support the first hypothesis of the study which suggest that "the outbreak of conflicts in ECCAS member states poses insecurity to the entire sub-region"

The transnational flows of contraband undermine state building and perpetuate insecurity in Central Africa. So far the response of ECCAS' has been predominantly military but the organisation has identified the need to develop tools for intelligence gathering and sharing, and to facilitate both strategic and technical collaboration between bordering states. One obstacle is the lack of properly demarked borders, which is addressed in the ECCAS border programme established in 2008 to limit criminal activities.

Also, the lack of regional leader (hegemon) is another problem which has impedes regional integration effort in the ECCAS region and this revelation

ties with hypothesis 3 which indicate that the absence of a regional has an adverse effect on the progress of ECCAS. No state is willing to act as a regional leader to push integration further. This is mainly due to mistrust amongst member states as well as influence from former colonial master (such as France). The EU and France are the largest international partners. In the absence of a strong regional leader among the ECCAS countries, this role has often been taken indirectly by France. In fact, donors have had a great impact on the set up of the central African peace and security architecture. France has, for example, financed 25-30 per cent of the MICOPAX operation, and provided approximately 150 military personnel to ensure its operational support. As a result, France has in many cases been seen as providing a stronger response than the ECCAS states themselves. The reliance on donor funding and support alongside a lack of political interest among member states have led ECCAS open to donor-driven priorities. It could be argued that this has only further eroded the political commitment of the member states to the organization.

The study also contends that the principal aim being not regional integration but regional intergovernmental cooperation, the Central African security engagement is supposed to primarily strengthen and support the member states' governments through multinational forces and common defence mechanisms and to rebuild their weak and insufficient capacities. It is conceived by the states' representatives as a way to protect their interests, to support political allies and to mutually confirm sovereignty and authority if these are compromised by subversive forces or conflicting interests. In this regard, communitarian security strategies and activities remain quite superficial and are not expected to address issues and policy fields considered as traditional reserve of the state, such as notably questions of domestic

policy. As a consequence, the Central African regionalisation process is not supposed to lead to the emergence of a new and strong supranational acting level. Hence, it provides no vital and sustainable solution to the states' incapacity in responding to their populations' security needs and to the partial inappropriateness and inefficiency of single state approaches in addressing security challenges with transnational dimensions or of general regional concern.

A major challenge to regional peace and security in ECCAS' region relates to the issue of political commitment by the leadership of member states. Because state leaders recognise that their ability to exert state power is limited by weak institutional structures, capacities and infrastructure as well by the existence and subversive activities of non-state political forces, their willingness to cede sovereignty to the community level has remained low. In the absence of a common vision or "regional consciousness",regional politics is further undermined by individual interests and the failure to further deepen the regionalisation process. Thus, community activities tend to be increasingly used by political actors to demonstrate their role as legitimate rulers of sovereign states and to further defend their political interests. The way in which community summits and conferences are celebrated, as well as the quarrels over the location of headquarters and distribution of posts in regional bodies and institutions, indeed raises the question whether these events and institutions are not used by national elites to enhance their prestige and demonstrate their political importance rather than for promoting agreements and regional policies.

5.2 Conclusion

With the creation of a Central African PSA, ECCAS has set itself ambitious targets. The weak unity within the community as well as the lack of a dynamic and common vision that could move the regionalisation process forward in a consistent and continuous way challenge the realisation of these targets significantly. So also does the remaining mistrust among some member states, as well as mutual interference into internal affairs. Particular strategic and economic interests thus undermine efforts towards strengthening regional cooperation and promoting security and stability. Chad's influence on the political situation and stability in its neighbour the CAR has, for instance, considerably overshadowed ECCAS and CEMAC's peace operations in the country as well as regional engagement in the settlement of the crisis.

Although peace and security are highly prioritised within ECCAS, a combination of regional rivalries and distrust, hyper-centralised decision-making, and a member state-run General Secretariat with no right of initiative have hampered the development of ECCAS to become a relevant peace and security actor. This has been exacerbated by insufficient financial and human resources and a militarized view on security matters. While ECCAS remains an important forum for discussions between member states on security matters, many of the people interviewed for this study expressed the view that the organisation is little more than a conference organiser when Heads of State decide to convene. This normally happens on an ad hoc basis as a reaction to ongoing crises and rarely, if ever, in order to take decisions on preventive measures. The region faces a number of security challenges which call for preventive measures to tackle such things as the risk of electoral violence and social unrest.

The process is lacking in self-dynamic and remains significantly depending on the willingness of the member states and their main political decision makers. In this perspective, the provision of security through communitarian action is not conceived in a sense of continuance, pro-activeness and comprehensiveness, and policies are not intended to compensate and complement national approaches on the long-term where these prove inadequate and in sufficient. From this point of view, regionalisation is not intended, in Central Africa, to generate a new political order based on the idea of integration and power sharing in view of adequately responding to the current security situation. Instead it is aimed to preserve and guarantee the governments' exclusive powers and to consolidate the existing political state-based structures.

The member states have been unable to agree upon the contents of an institutional reform, with the aim of merging ECCAS with CEMAC and transforming the General Secretariat into a more powerful Commission, and this weakens ECCAS an actor: it is mainly used by member states at their convenience. This highlights how member states are often reluctant to create strong regional organisations at the possible expense of national sovereignty, unless there is an evident added value in doing so. As long as ECCAS member states see little added value in a stronger ECCAS, the organisation will remain a weak peace and security actor.

5.3 Recommendations

The study recommends that ECCAS government should improve on border security to prevent spill over conflict from neighbouring region. This is because the study reveals that the Central African sub-region is a host to many rebels group and in addition there should be total disarmament.

Also, the major cause of conflict being poor governance, unconstitutional means to power, and lack democracy, therefore, the ECCAS government should promote good governance and democracy and as well promote human right and rule of law.

Due to lack of a regional hegemon, the progress of ECCAS has been hampered and thus, the study also recommend the need a regional leader.

Also, ECCAS government should not only focus on militarized form of security and should look at security from human security perspective.

Non-state actors should be encouraged to further influence and participate in the regionalisation process as it presents an appropriate way to address their needs and concerns where single state acting proves insufficient to do so. Non state actors should perceive the cooperation with state actors and with the international community on the communitarian level as a chance for having their interests better considered. Improving the participatory mechanisms on the communitarian level and making use of them would allow the civil society's actors to counterbalance the intergovernmental nature of the process and to give more importance and attention to issues and concerns other than those emphasized by the states. Therefore, they should promote regional approaches also in policy fields where these are currently still less developed but where they could ease the satisfaction of people's concerns, such as in social, societal or environmental questions. For civil societies, regional integration could finally also present an opportunity to better cooperate among them on the intraregional and interregional level, as well as to better communicate with the international community.

The study also recommends the need for CEMAC absorbed by ECCAS, the issue of overlapping membership has become a problem rather than a solution in terms of regionalism in Central Africa's sub-region. CEMAC has been

more adhering than ECCAS and members of CEMAC pays more allergens to it membership than in ECCAS. To booster regionalism, the monetary union in CEMAC could include all the other four members of ECCAS. However, colonial ties with the CFA and what others see as French controlled of CEMAC could also impedes the process. However, the government of ECCAS should see the important of merging the two regional integration schemes since both CEMAC and ECCAS has similar objectives.

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